

STATE OF FLORIDA)
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COUNTY OF MIAMI-DADE)

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Affiant Number One "A1"

I Jonathan Santana, a Detective with the Miami-Dade Police Department ("MDPD") and Task Force Officer ("TFO") with the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI"), being duly sworn, deposes, and states that:

1. I am an investigative or law enforcement officer within the meaning of Section 2510(7) of Title 18, United States Code, and Florida Statute § 934.02(6), that is, an officer of the United States who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of and to make arrests for offenses enumerated in Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code and offenses enumerated in Florida Statute § 934.07.

2. I have been an officer with MDPD since May 2005. I have received basic training in narcotics, money laundering, and related investigations at the Miami-Dade Police Academy located in Miami, Florida. I am currently assigned to Homeland Security Investigations, Group 17 since June, 2012, as a Task Force Officer.

3. Your Affiant has been the affiant on numerous arrest warrants and has participated in numerous search warrants. Your Affiant has effected arrests and testified in court based upon evidence seized during the execution of those warrants and arrest affidavits. Many of those investigations involved the trafficking of narcotics and/or money laundering.

4. Your Affiant has received specialized training in the identification of narcotics and dangerous drugs and money laundering investigations by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD), and the South Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area ("HIDTA"), as well as several other law enforcement agencies.

5. In connection with my official duties as a TFO, I am responsible for conducting investigations into violations of Title 21 of the United States Code, governing food and drugs, and other federal criminal statutes, as well as Florida Statutes Chapter 893 concerning drug abuse prevention and control, Chapter 896 concerning offenses related to financial transactions, and other Florida criminal statutes. I have received training regarding the investigation of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. In particular, I have participated in numerous narcotics investigations, including investigating possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute and the distribution of controlled substances, in violation of Florida State Statutes Chapter 893. I have also participated in numerous money laundering investigations involving Florida Statute 896. These investigations have resulted in the arrests of more than twenty targets and the seizure of various narcotics and assets, including interdiction of bulk cash meant to be laundered through the United States financial system.

6. During the course of these investigations, I have debriefed defendants, informants, and witnesses who had personal knowledge regarding narcotics trafficking organizations. I have conducted physical surveillances, prepared affidavits, executed numerous search warrants, analyzed evidence and information obtained from court-authorized pen register and trap and trace devices, telephone toll records, and reviewed and transcribed recorded calls. I have also participated in and supported multiple investigations where wire intercepts were used and been the affiant in eight (8) wiretap applications. As a result of my experience and training, I am familiar with the methods of operation typically used in drug trafficking and money laundering, including the manner in which various types of illegal drugs are cultivated, manufactured, smuggled, distributed, or diverted, as well as methods used to finance drug transactions and launder drug proceeds. I know that drug traffickers often require the use of a

telephone facility to negotiate times, places, schemes, and manner for importing, possessing, concealing, and distributing controlled substances, and for arranging the disposition of proceeds from the sale of controlled substances. I know that money launderers and drug traffickers also use cellular telephones to facilitate and coordinate money drops/pickups. I also know that money launderers and drug traffickers use fraudulent information to subscribe to communication facilities to thwart law enforcement efforts to intercept their communications and to ascertain their identity.

Affiant Number Two "A2"

I Charles Thomas, a special agent with HSI being duly sworn, deposes, and state that:

7. I am an investigative or law enforcement officer within the meaning of Section 2510(7) of Title 18, United States Code, and Florida Statute § 934.02(6), that is, an officer of the United States who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of and to make arrests for offenses enumerated in Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code and offenses enumerated in Florida Statute § 934.07.

8. I have been a law enforcement officer for nearly twenty years. Prior to becoming a law enforcement officer, your co-affiant received his Bachelor of Arts degree in international relations from Florida International University and worked in various capacities in the private sector. In 1998, your co-affiant accepted employment with the U.S. Customs Service, in their Miami office, as a customs inspector. Pursuant to this employment, your co-affiant completed a four month academy class at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center ("FLETC" from hereafter) in Brunswick, Georgia. During my time at FLETC, I engaged in the study of U.S. customs law, including processing international passengers, collecting international duties, and

the application of tariffs in the processing of international cargo. In addition, your co-affiant studied Fourth and Fifth Amendment principles, with a focus on border search authority, and the use of firearms and self-defense.

9. From July 1998 until May of 2004, your co-affiant was employed by the U.S. Customs Service in a variety of positions, spending the majority of my time working international narcotics smuggling at both the Miami International Airport and the Port of Miami. My work resulted in countless arrests for violations of federal narcotics law. In the year 2001 alone, your co-affiant was responsible for fifty-six narcotics related arrests. As a result, that year I was named by the U.S. Customs Service as Miami's Office of Field Operations outstanding narcotics agent.

10. In addition to the arrests I have made, during my six years of service with the U.S. Customs Service, your co-affiant's work resulted in the seizure of over one-hundred (100) kilograms of illicit narcotics and large amounts of currency being smuggled both into and out of the United States. Due to my expertise, I was eventually made senior custom inspector, training other inspectors in how to conduct narcotics interdictions. In this capacity, the United States government flew me to New York and Los Angeles to conduct trainings, in addition to the trainings I conducted in Miami. Before leaving the U.S. Customs Service in 2004, your co-affiant had received numerous awards in recognition of my work.

11. In May of 2004, your co-affiant transferred from the U.S. Customs Service to Immigration and Customs Enforcement's ("ICE" from hereafter) investigative arm, as a special agent. Subsequently, ICE's investigative groups became what is now known as Homeland Security Investigations. Once again, your co-affiant was sent to FLETC for additional training before becoming a special agent. This training included an eleven week course on basic criminal

investigations, and an additional eleven week academy specific to immigration and customs enforcement. Upon completion of the aforementioned, your co-affiant began work in the Miami Field Office as a special agent assigned to a narcotics interdiction group, eventually working up to complex criminal conspiracies utilizing employees imbedded within the infrastructure of U.S. ports of entry to illegally transport various contraband.

12. In the summer of 2007, your co-affiant was sent back to FLETC to attend undercover operations school and subsequently joined HSI Miami's Financial Division. For the past eight years your co-affiant has been responsible for investigating trade-based money laundering, with a focus on the Black Market Peso Exchange ("BMPE" from hereafter). During this time, I have developed an extensive base of knowledge regarding how international narcotics trafficking organizations employ the BMPE to receive the profits of their illegal drug sales throughout the world and how those organizations employ international import and export businesses to facilitate this activity. My familiarity with trade-based money laundering is multi-faceted:

First, I have been trained by some of the most experienced money laundering experts in the country regarding the methods and means of laundering profits generated by means of criminal enterprise. I have benefited exponentially from the work of those who came before me in discerning the patterns of activity in question and understanding the subtle indicators of an individual, business, or organizations' involvement in money laundering.

Second, I have logged hundreds of hours listening to and reading the contents of the communications of money launderers intercepted by law enforcement during the execution of proactive investigations. Studying these communications has provided a wealth of knowledge

that would normally be reserved for members and conspirators in the organizations conducting these schemes, opening up their clandestine operations in a way understood by very few.

Third, I have debriefed and/or been the controlling agent for numerous confidential sources surreptitiously working on behalf of law enforcement while appearing to be acting on behalf of the groups being investigated. My experience in these debriefs has both corroborated my existing knowledge and augmented my understanding of trade-based money laundering.

Fourth, as a case-agent, and while assisting other agents in their own investigations, I have directed the handling of dozens of undercover operations in which money has been laundered on behalf of criminal enterprises. Doing so has allowed me to observe the manner in which the subject transactions take place from the initiation through complete exoneration of the debts in question.

13. Your co-affiant's investigations into trade-based money laundering has resulted in significant arrests and the seizure of millions of dollars of monies subsequently forfeited to the government. In addition, your co-affiant has extensive experience testifying in both state and federal courts in various hearings and in front of the grand jury. I've participated in the execution of numerous search warrants, and I am experienced in the use of pre registers, trap-and-trace devices, mobile tracking devices, and wiretaps as a means of conducting electronic surveillance.

Basis of Knowledge

14. This affidavit is based upon personal knowledge derived from participation in this investigation and upon information believed to be reliable from the following sources:

- a. oral reports, written reports, and other documentation about this investigation received from HSI agents at SAC/Miami, other HSI SAC offices, and the Drug Enforcement Administration;
- b. A1 and A2's discussions concerning this investigation with experienced money laundering investigators;
- c. physical surveillances and investigations conducted by HSI SAC/Miami, other HSI offices, the Miami Dade Police Department, and various other local police departments throughout the county;
- d. public records in both the United States and Colombia;
- e. telephone toll records, pen register and trap and trace information, and telephone subscriber information for BBM1, BBM2, and numerous other electronic devices used to facilitate the criminal activity under investigation;
- f. interviews with business owners in the United States and Colombia that use the BMPE to receive or transfer payment for goods and services being exchanged between the two countries;
- g. interviews with BMPE money couriers, Smurfs, and brokers working in both the United States and Colombia; and
- h. eight wire and electronic interceptions conducted on the BBM PINs of Colombian money brokers associated with this investigation.

15. Since this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of securing an arrest warrant A1 and A2 have not included each and every fact known to them concerning this investigation. A1 and A2 have set forth only those facts that they believe are essential to establish the necessary foundation for the requested warrant.

Trade Based Money Laundering and “The Black Market Peso Exchange”

16. The BMPE is a type of trade-based money laundering characterized by a complex series of international trade transactions in which money brokers, a/k/a, “intermediarios de pesos,” manipulate foreign currency markets to route drug proceeds through the U.S. financial system. It is estimated that as much as \$5 billion is laundered annually through the BMPE. BMPE-type schemes exist in numerous countries in Latin and South America, including Argentina, Aruba, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela, but Colombia is home to the largest and most sophisticated BMPE in the world.

17. The BMPE is designed to benefit all involved parties. Colombian drug traffickers seek to be paid for exported narcotics in untraceable Colombian pesos without attracting the attention of law enforcement. However the proceeds of the narcotics sales will be in the form of small U.S. bills located within the United States and the physical movement of large sums of small bills is easily susceptible to law enforcement interdiction efforts. Additionally, even if bulk currency is successfully smuggled into Colombia, the Colombian trafficker requires funds in the form of Colombian pesos to continue organizational operation.

18. Colombian importers of U.S.-made goods seek to settle existing or prospective debts to U.S.-based exporters. By settling these debts through the BMPE, the Colombian importer enjoys a discounted exchange rate, free of taxes and regulation by the state-run central bank. The products purchased from the U.S.-based exporters are then smuggled into Colombia, often through Panama, Aruba, and Venezuela, in avoidance of taxes. However much of the merchandise is moved directly into Colombian ports where bribed officials allow the goods to bypass customs.

19. Money brokers are the conduits through which the BMPE system works. These brokers purchase large amounts of narcotics proceeds in the form of U.S. currency located within the United States. The broker's agents (couriers) clandestinely deposit these U.S. dollars into bank accounts so the funds may be easily manipulated. The broker sells the U.S. dollars to the Colombian importers. In exchange, the broker receives Colombian pesos in Colombia. Thus the Colombian importer can settle the U.S.-based debt with U.S. currency and the broker can pay the Colombian drug trafficker in Colombian pesos.

20. The U.S.-based businesses in question quickly become addicted to the cheap, readily available cash, because to remain viable with their Latin American business partners they must respond to the market's requirements. Due to inflated official exchange rates, money transferring (wire-transferring) fees, and significant import taxes in many Latin American countries, a thriving black market of otherwise licit products and services dominates many of their economies. In order for the U.S.-based businesses to be competitive in these various marketplaces, they must accept bulk narcotics proceeds or run the very real risk of losing business to those who will or to competitors from other countries.

21. Mexican drug cartels participate by purchasing the narcotics on credit from Colombian drug traffickers, distributing the narcotics to U.S. cities, collecting the proceeds of the narcotics sales, and delivering a portion of the proceeds to the money broker's couriers, to extinguish their debt to the Colombian cartel. The Mexican cartels are also known to employ Colombian money brokers to repatriate their profits from the product sold on the streets in the United States.

22. Money couriers working for the Mexican Cartels do not have a direct relationship with the Colombian Cartels or the money broker's organization. When a Colombian drug

trafficker is to receive payment for already-exported narcotics from his/her Mexican counterpart, the Colombian trafficker will hire a Colombia-based money broker. The money broker will provide the Colombian trafficker with the contact information for a money courier located in the United States. The Colombian trafficker will then pass that contact information along to a representative of the Mexican drug cartel with instructions to deliver currency to the broker's courier. The Mexican cartel's representative will then instruct his courier, also located in the United States, to follow the instructions.

23. Therefore the parties who will physically transfer the U.S. dollars consist of a Mexican cartel's courier and a Colombian money broker's courier. Neither courier will have ever met the other, may have limited knowledge of their own superiors, and will have no relevant information regarding their counterpart's organization.

24. This is because the organizations seek to achieve the maximum amount of anonymity feasible by employing a byzantine network of couriers, representatives, and agents. The structures of the contracting organizations involve layers of subordinates that insulate the highest levels from the more easily identified lower ranking members. Thus, only high ranking members of the Colombian cartels would know the identity of the money broker being employed to effectuate the transaction, while no one on the Mexican side of the transaction would have any knowledge of this person's identity.

The Typical Colombian BMPE Transaction Involving Drug Debts Owed to a Colombian Drug Cartel

25. A typical Colombian BMPE transaction involving drug debts owed to a Colombian drug cartel occurs as follows:

First, a Colombian drug trafficker sells narcotics on credit to a Mexican cartel that maintains a smuggling and distribution network. It is understood that payment from the Mexicans will be in the form of U.S. currency, to be exchanged between the parties in the United States upon the subsequent sale of the narcotics. The drugs are then sold by the Mexican cartel to intermediaries and drug dealers in various U.S. cities. The cash proceeds from these sales are collected in numerous stash houses to ultimately be laundered into the U.S. financial system.

Second, after the Mexicans have distributed the narcotics and collected the profits, they will notify the Colombians. In response, a representative of the Colombian drug trafficker approaches a money broker, known as a “primera mano” (first hand) and solicits the sale of United States currency located within the United States in exchange for a percentage, generally five to fifteen percent of the total contract, which will typically be for no less than \$50,000.00 and no more than \$1,000,000.00.

Third, the primera mano Colombian money broker will offer the contract to one or several sub-brokers, who will bid on the contract based on the current official exchange rates. The contract will then be sold to the sub-broker offering to purchase the currency at the highest exchange rate. In this way, the primera mano broker will again profit from the transaction, because he is selling the currency at an advantageous exchange rate.

Fourth, the sub-broker reviews his book of business to determine which Colombian business are in need of U.S. currency to purchase goods or services to be

exported from the U.S. to Colombia. Thereafter, a Colombia-based business owner and the sub-broker will negotiate an exchange rate for the purchase of the U.S. currency which is greater than that for which the sub-broker purchased the currency from the primera mano broker. The sub-broker's only profit is the difference between these two exchange rates.

Fifth, the Colombian business in need of the U.S. currency will contact the U.S.-based business they are purchasing products or services from to let them know that the transaction can be finalized and that payment will be forthcoming from an unspecified third-party.

Sixth, the sub-broker reaches out to his network of U.S.-based "pick-up crews," consisting of money couriers and other individuals with access to accounts at various global financial institutions. The sub-broker and representative from the pick-up crew negotiate a fee for the contract in the form of a percentage of the total currency to be collected. The fee generally ranges from 2% - 10% depending on the risk associated with the amount and location of the currency. Once the contract is accepted by the pick-up crew, their representative provides the sub-broker with the phone number of the courier they will be using to pick up the currency.

Seventh, after contracting with an appropriate pick-up crew, the sub-broker passes along the pick-up crew's courier's contact information to the primera mano broker, who, in turn, contacts the Colombian drug trafficker's representative. The primera mano broker provides the cartel representative with the information and requests a phone

number and passphrase or serial number for the Mexican cartel's money courier in the U.S. This courier will physically transfer the currency to the sub-broker's pick-up crew.

Eight, the sub-broker provides the U.S based pick-up crew with the phone number of the Mexican cartel's courier and a passphrase or serial number. The pick-up crew waits for a phone call from the Mexican cartel's courier. The phone call generally consists of a terse conversation consisting of little more than a verification of a dollar amount, the exchange of the passphrase or serial number, and an agreement regarding when and where to meet for the physical exchange of the currency.

Ninth, the pick-up crew receives the currency from the Mexican cartel's money courier. The physical exchange will generally take place in a public location, typically a parking lot. During the transaction the parties will not engage in conversation, the money will not be counted, and there is no receipt for the currency to document the exchange. The money will be packaged in quick-count bundles held together with rubber bands and be housed in an unusual manner, such as a duffle-bag, shoebox, pillowcase, etc. Once this physical exchange has taken place, the debt owed by the Mexican Cartel to the Colombian Cartel is exonerated and the debt to the Colombian cartel is now owed by the money brokers.

Tenth, the pick-up crew surreptitiously moves the currency into the U.S. financial system through funnel accounts that are used to temporarily hold the money until it can be provided to the U.S.-based business that the Colombian business is purchasing goods or services from. The accounts in question are opened and maintained by individuals known as "Smurfs," who are sent from Colombia to the United States to deposit bulk

illicit currency into numerous accounts in repetitious relatively small deposits designed to avoid generating scrutiny from law enforcement.

Eleventh, the sub-broker sends instructions to the pick-up crew regarding where the currency in the Smurf's funnel account is ultimately to be deposited, dropped-off, or, wired. The currency is then moved into the specified accounts, which are usually domiciled either in the U.S. or the Far East, in accounts controlled by the U.S.-based exporter in question.

Twelfth, upon completion of the currency transfer, the sub-broker sends confirmation of the receipt of currency to the U.S.-based business, which will signify to that business owner that the goods or services desired by the Colombian based business may be rendered, released, or shipped to Colombia. This settles the debt between the two otherwise legitimate businesses.

Thirteenth, immediately thereafter, the Colombian-based business will release Colombian pesos in the agreed upon amount to the sub-broker, who provides the pesos to the primera mano broker, to be paid out to the Colombian drug trafficker. This final transaction exonerates the debt owned by the money brokers to the Colombian drug trafficker who has now received the profits from the initial sale of narcotics to the Mexican cartel on credit.

The Typical Colombian BMPE Transaction Involving Drug Profits to be Remunerated to a Mexican Drug Cartel

26. The above described transaction explained how Colombian cartels are paid by Mexican cartels once the narcotics they have exchanged have been sold on the streets of the United States. The remainder of the money generated by those sales remains in the stash house as the Mexican cartel's profits. Although the Mexican drug cartels have several ways of moving drug money from the United States to Mexico, including physically smuggling it across the Mexican-American border and their own trade-based money laundering with Mexican businesses and money brokers, they also employ the Colombian BMPE to launder their money. A typical Colombian BMPE transaction involving drug profits to be remunerated to a Mexican drug cartel occurs as in the same fashion described above with the following differences:

First, the Colombian primera mano broker in question will be dealing directly with a representative of the Mexican cartel and the transaction in question will have no connection to any Colombian narco-traffickers.

Second, once the Colombian money broker has received pesos in Colombia from the Colombian-based businessperson he will need to pay out the debt in Mexico, instead of Colombia. This is done via a system known as "contra-entrega," (mirror transaction), which is a form of hawala. Hawala is a system of exchanging money that has been used in the Middle East and South Asia for hundreds of years, but is currently employed worldwide to exchange money outside of legitimate financial institutions. Hawala involves money brokers with long-standing relationships and strong financial ties to a particular locality. When a hawaladar is asked to transfer money from one location to

another by a client, he will contact a hawaladar in the location where the client wants the money moved to. The first hawaladar asks the second to pay out a certain amount of money in that location to a money courier and provides a phone number and pass-phrase to verify the courier's identity. The second hawaladar then contacts the courier and arranges for the exchange. Both hawaladars profit by charging a fee for their services, however, the second hawaladar still needs to be made whole for the *res* of the transaction. This is accomplished over time as the two hawaladars continue to do business together their debts will eventually even out because the transactions in question will move in both directions.

Third, the Colombian money broker will call his business associate in Mexico, acting as a hawaladar, with the phone number and pass-phrase of the Mexican cartel's representative in Mexico. The cartel's representative and the hawaladar's representative will then agree on an exchange location and a physical exchange of currency will take place, exhausting the Colombian money broker's debt to the Mexican cartel, who have now received the profits of their American narcotics sales in the form of pesos within the confines of Mexico.

27. Through this system the following has been accomplished:

- a. The drug trafficker has recovered his illicit profits, which were effectively trapped in the U.S., in his preferred form of payment (pesos);
- b. The Colombian business owner has purchased U.S. goods or services at a discounted rate, completely tax free;
- c. The money broker earned a profit by buying pesos low and selling them high;

- d. The pick-up crew receives a percentage of the currency collected;
- e. The Mexican cartel and its couriers are relieved of the debt owed the Colombian drug exporter for the initial purchase of narcotics.

28. BMPE transactions are designed and conducted in a fashion intended to obscure the direct relationship between the money being moved and the trafficking in illegal narcotics. It is the facts surrounding these transactions establish that the currency moved is the proceeds of illicit activity. Such facts generally include:

- a. The individuals involved in these transactions have never met previously and never meet again. They are provided with a prearranged code in the form of cryptic passphrases and/or random serial numbers that allow both parties to verify that they were representing the specific trafficker and a specific money broker's interest in the transaction;
- b. When the trafficker's counterpart and the money broker's counterpart make telephonic contact, they exchange an assigned code, passphrase, or serial number for the money pick-up, decide on a location and time to meet, and exchange vehicle, clothing, or physical descriptions. This is done without any conversation regarding the interests they are representing, their identities, the subject of the meeting, etc.;
- c. The currency is transferred between the individuals without being counted and without an offer of a receipt or a request for a receipt;

- d. The currency exchanged is often significantly more or significantly less than the amount agreed upon by the parties, showing a necessary elasticity in the relationships between the parties that would not be acceptable in a legitimate business relationship;
- e. The currency is transferred in a container designed to disguise the existence of the currency. Examples include computer boxes or gaming system boxes, shoe boxes, shopping bags, duffle bags, pillow cases, etc.;
- f. The currency is separated and packaged into “quick count bundles,” held together by rubber bands, as opposed to being packaged in bank bands marked with denominations;
- g. The currency is well-worn cash that shows significant use in casual transactions, consistent with street-level narcotics sales and an enterprise that avoids use of the banking system;
- h. The currency is not exchanged at a place of business. Instead, the meetings take place in a neutral, public location where legitimate business on this scale would never be conducted, but the risk of a robbery is ameliorated by the presence of the general public. As a rule of thumb, parking lots in major business centers are used for the physical exchange of currency;
- i. The individuals involved in these transactions are acutely cognizant of their surroundings and the actions of vehicles and individuals in the area where they are to pick up or deliver cash. It is common for these individuals to drive

around the area where a transaction is to take place and search for the presence of police or the presence of individuals whom they may perceive to be a threat to commit robbery. It is also common for the individuals delivering the currency to have other individuals conducting counter-surveillance, to prevent robbery and/or to identify police activity;

- j. In transit to and from these illicit financial transactions, it is common for the couriers to continuously monitor their vehicle mirrors for surveillance, make abrupt U-turns, drive down one way streets, stop in the middle of a roadway while observing passing vehicles, drive at an excessive rate of speed, make abrupt lane changes, and pull into numerous parking lots without ever exiting their vehicle (a practice known as “cleaning¹” themselves). As a whole, these driving maneuvers, designed to detect surveillance, are commonly referred to by law enforcement as “heat runs.” This behavior is indicative of the individual’s knowledge of the illicit nature of the transaction and the illegal origin of the currency they are transporting/distributing;
- k. In cases where stash-houses used by money couriers have been identified and subsequently approached by law enforcement, consent searches and the execution of search warrants often reveal additional bulk cash and large amounts of narcotics commingled in with the currency.

¹ “Cleaning,” may be accomplished in various fashions, but is generally employed by criminals as a form of counter-surveillance or to limit law enforcement’s ability to effectively conduct surveillance.

Expert Testimony on the BMPE

29. Throughout the course of this investigation, both A1 and A2 have engaged in extensive research, by way of interviews and conversations with subject matter experts in trade based money laundering and the Black Market Peso Exchange. Amongst those consulted were state and federal law enforcement officers with decades of experience investigating hundreds of BMPE cells with ties to various Latin American countries. Those individuals uniformly agreed that the BMPE is fueled by currency generated as a result of trans-national narcotics trafficking. They also collectively agreed that narcotics are the overwhelmingly dominant form of illicit exports from Latin American countries operating black market currency exchanges. While other forms of trade based money laundering exist and may be employed with other criminal schemes, none of the investigators surveyed could cite a single example of a BMPE case that employed currency derived from an alternative form of illegal activity.

30. There are disparate reasons for this. For example, John Tobon, Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the Miami Field Division of Homeland Security Investigations, noted that although Latin American criminals engage in human trafficking and human smuggling, unlike narcotics trafficking, which is a credit based enterprise, human trafficking and human smuggling operations tend to be *pay-as-you-go*, meaning every time the person being trafficked or smuggled changes hands, an accounting is rendered and payment is made; thus, there is no need to launder any proceeds back to the home country via the BMPE. Investigator Tommy Moran of the South Florida Money Laundering Strike Force, a former Detective with the Miami Beach Police Department with over forty years of experience investigating organized crime, noted that he gained an intimate familiarity with how gambling proceeds are paid out and debts are collected by participating in dozens of wiretap investigations. According to Investigator Moran,

gambling collections and payouts are not conducted in the anonymous fashion that is integral to the BMPE, but rather are handled by trusted associates who have developed relationships over long periods of time. Also, historically, bookmaking, loansharking, the numbers racket, bolita, illegal lottery schemes, and other forms of illegal gambling payouts and collections are not conducted in the form of the vast quantities of bulk currency which characterize the BMPE, but rather in significantly more modest transactions. Moreover, payouts of gambling proceeds and collections of gambling debts are meticulously counted for accuracy and the types of fluctuations above or below the agreed upon exchange, which are both expected and accepted in the BMPE, are not seen in gambling operations.

31. Other forms of organized crime can be eliminated as possible sources of currency for simpler reasons: In the case of cargo theft, which is also prevalent among Latin American criminal enterprises, the proceeds of the activity flow in the opposite direction of the BMPE, with criminal organizations overseas paying syndicates in the United States for their stolen products. In the various lucrative forms of insurance fraud, public assistance fraud, and tax fraud, being effectuated by criminals with ties to Latin American countries, the proceeds of the criminal activities are not generated in the form of cash, but rather as drafts or checks, thus, the BMPE is not useful to those engaged in large scale fraud.

The Application of the Statutory Provisions Proscribing Money Laundering in Florida

32. Florida Statute §896.101, also known as the “Florida Money Laundering Act,” governs financial transactions that constitute criminal offenses against the State. Although this single statute requires the use of nearly 2,500 words to define its application, its operative language is as follows:

- (3) It is unlawful for a person:
- (a) Knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, to conduct or attempt to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity:
1. With the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
 2. Knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part:
 - a. To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
 - b. To avoid a transaction reporting requirement or money transmitters' registration requirement under state law.
- (b) To transport or attempt to transport a monetary instrument or funds:
1. With the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
 2. Knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in part:
 - a. To conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
 - b. To avoid a transaction reporting requirement or money transmitters' registration requirement under state law.

33. Coalesced into something intelligible to the lay person, §896.101 makes engaging in any of the following four acts a felony:

- Exchanging illegally generated currency² with any individual or institution for the purpose continuing or benefiting illegal activity³;
- Exchanging illegally generated currency with any individual or institution to obscure it's illegal nature;
- Transporting any currency, whether illegally or legitimately generated, for the purpose of continuing or benefiting illegal activity;

² The source of the illegally generated currency, as applied to each subsection of the statute, must be from an enumerated specified unlawful activity, however, the participants to the laundering need only believe that the currency was generated by any act, specified or not, that would constitute a felony under state or federal law. Florida Statute 896.101(2)(a).

³ The illegal activity being promoted under each subsection of 896.101 must be one of the enumerated specified unlawful activities listed in subsection (2)(g).

- Transporting illegally generated currency to obscure its illegal nature

34. Accordingly, the currency drops used to facilitate the BMPE are, in and of themselves, completed money laundering transactions regardless of whether any other facet of the scheme is ever effectuated.

The Enterprise

35. Operation Neymar focused on the actions of a large group of Colombian money launderers based in Cali, Colombia, working together on a daily basis, providing the human capital necessary to keep up with the large volume of money laundering contracts available to them from drug cartels entrenched in Mexico and Colombia, capitalizing on the surfeit drug markets of the western world. The two main targets of the investigation were Ivan Andres LIZARAZO MENDOZA, a/k/a “NEYMAR,” “CR7,” “ROBBEN,” “BALE,” “JACOBO,” and “ALI” and Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, a/k/a “PEDRITO,” “MANUEL,” “ANTONIO,” and “GUERO,” whom, along with other associates identified and unidentified, will be collectively referred to as “the Enterprise.”

36. As stated, the Enterprise consisted of trans-national money launderers working on contract with Latin American narco-traffickers. Although subject to changes in leadership and hierarchy due to disruption by law enforcement and extra-judicial sanctioning in the form of various acts of intimidation and violence, the Enterprise continued to exist throughout the period specified in this information and at all times consisted of Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA, Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, and numerous “John DOES” operating under aliases designed to protect their identity from each other and from law enforcement. The purpose of the Enterprise was to generate monetary profits, which were earned by laundering narco-dollars on behalf of

Mexican and Colombian drug cartels through the U.S. financial system and facilitated by international trade between the United States and Latin America. The Enterprise intentionally operated in a compartmentalized fashion in order to exploit specialization of labor and to shield the very fact of its existence, which ensured the relative security of the individual members from each other and from law enforcement.

37. Within the Enterprise, CASTRO SANTANA acted as the point of contact with the narco-traffickers whose currency needed to be laundered in order to make it available to them in Latin America. LIZARAZO MENDOZA acted as a point of contact with the businesses that were employed to move the money into the U.S. financial system and also as a point of contact with the Enterprise's money couriers. Thus, CASTRO SANTANA would receive the initial money laundering contracts from the Enterprise's narco-trafficker clients and LIZARAZO MENDOZA would attend to the practical aspects of laundering the money. In addition to CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA, the Enterprise consisted of individuals yet to be fully identified, who worked full-time in the money laundering scheme as intermediaries, book-keepers, couriers, and administrative assistants.

38. The Enterprise was capable of laundering approximately \$1,000,000.00 per month during the majority of the investigation and sometimes significantly more. In the thirteen months between July 25, 2014, and August 24, 2015, more than \$1,000,000.00 was seized from the Enterprise, along with quantities of cocaine, heroin, cannabis, a money counter, a narcotics press, a heat-sealer used to package bulk currency, several ledgers, and myriad packaging materials associated with drug trafficking.

39. Through the course of the investigation information received via intercepted communications, subject interviews, and various other sources has indicated that the laundered

drug profits in question have belonged to at least two different organizations: (1) The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia Cartel, a/k/a *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia* or “AUC,” which is a drug trafficking organization comprised the remnants of the former AUC, which was a Colombian right-wing paramilitary group, representing an intellectual counter-point to the FARC and ELN, financed in large part through participating in narco-trafficking; and (2) the Sinaloa Cartel, which is generally recognized as the most powerful drug trafficking organization in the world, headed by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, who is currently being held in Mexico, but under indictment in the United States in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT ALPHA
AMADO ORTIZ MARTINEZ
FEBRUARY 19, 2014 - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$49,980.00

40. On February 18, 2014, CS1⁴ was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA, making use of BBM1 and asked to assist with a pick-up of \$50,000 in bulk currency in Chicago, Illinois. CS1 was instructed by HSI SAC Miami to accept the contract and pass along a UC phone number for an HSI agent in Chicago, so that LIZARAZO MENDOZA could provide the number to the individuals in possession of the currency. After providing LIZARAZO MENDOZA with the UC number, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided CS1 with a money courier’s phone number and passphrase, “Arrocero de parte de Pajaro,” which translates to “From the Rice Grower on behalf of the Bird.”

⁴ CS1 acts as a subcontractor for the Enterprise, coordinating the physical pick-up of bulk currency in the United States and various other countries. He has noted that the Enterprise uses numerous different individuals to coordinate currency pick-ups Worldwide. For example, CS1 has reported that the Enterprise has a specific individual that they give preference to when handling a money laundering contract in Europe and that it is known that this individual charges 14 points (14 percent) of the currency collected for his services. CS1 works for HSI and is handled by A2.

41. Later that day, an HSI SAC Chicago UC spoke with the individual in possession of the currency. After exchanging/verifying the passphrase, the UC asked how many “tickets” were being exchanged, in reference to the amount of currency that was to change hands. The money courier responded that there were “fifty,” meaning \$50,000.00. The courier stated that he was not available to meet until later that day and they agreed to speak again that evening.

42. At 7:22 p.m. the parties spoke again, exchanging the passphrase, before discussing the business at hand. The courier indicated that the money was not available at the moment and would have to be delivered the following day, but indicated that he was close by and would like to meet, in-person, to discuss the details, so they would not have to talk on the phone – a clear reference to security concerns. The UC feigned unavailability for the face-to-face meeting and the two briefly discussed the urgency their “bosses” placed on completing the transaction. The courier stated his desire to get rid of “the problem,” referring to the currency, as soon as possible.

43. The following day, February 19, 2014, the parties spoke again and discussed possible meeting locations. They initially discussed meeting in a particular church parking lot, however, the UC moved the meet location to a location more advantageous to law enforcement by telling the courier that as he had approached the church there were “blue” stopped there, which was an indication of the presence of law enforcement. Accordingly the two agreed to meet in the parking lot of a nearby hospital.

44. Shortly thereafter, the courier entered the hospital parking lot driving a white 2004 Nissan Maxima, bearing Illinois plate number S136104, registered to an individual named Amado ORTIZ MARTINEZ, (DOB: 10/1/73), who was subsequently identified as the money courier in this transaction. Upon entering the parking lot, ORTIZ MARTINEZ drove to the

UC's location and, without exiting his vehicle, passed a white bag containing \$49,980.00 to the UC and immediately departed.

45. On February 20, 2014, the currency was removed from its secure location to be inspected by a trained narcotics detection K-9. Upon being examined by the K-9, the dog alerted to the positive presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

46. After receiving confirmation that the transaction had been completed, LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed CS1 to have the currency deposited into the following bank account:

Standard Chartered Bank
6 Battery Road #03-01, Singapore, 049909
Account
SWIFT⁵ - SCBLSG22

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT BRAVO
SUBJECT UNIDENTIFIED
MARCH 26, 2014 - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$57,000.00

47. On March 19, 2014, CS1 was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA and offered a contract for \$57,000, in Chicago, Illinois. A2 instructed CS1 to accept the contract and a phone number and the passphrase, "Jorge de parte de Saul" was provided.

48. On March 24, 2014, HSI SAC Chicago contacted the courier and the passphrase was exchanged. A photograph of the serial number for a dollar was also exchanged to be used by the drug trafficking organization to verify that the subsequently planned meet would be with

⁵ The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) provides a network that enables financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information about financial transactions in a secure, standardized and reliable environment. Swift also sells software and services to financial institutions.

the correct individual. The parties thereafter agreed to meet at the Premium Outlet Mall in Aurora, Illinois, around 3:00 p.m. that afternoon.

49. Shortly after 3:00 p.m., the courier arrived and met with an HSI SAC Chicago UC. In the parking lot of the mall, the money courier attempted to verify the serial number for the dollar bill provided earlier in the day. There was a discrepancy between the number being used by the two parties and the courier and UC returned to their respective vehicles and made phone calls in an attempt to rectify the situation with their superiors. Unable to resolve the situation for the moment, the courier departed the mall and for the next hour engaged in a series of counter-surveillance heat runs until, eventually, he successfully broke away from the mobile surveillance units.

50. On March 26, 2014, contact was reestablished with the courier and the parties agreed to meet in the parking lot of the Fox Valley Mall in Aurora, Illinois, for the exchange. At approximately 5:00 p.m., the UC met with and received the currency from the same subject he had met with on March 24. The money was packaged in quick-count bundles and concealed inside layers of plastic wrap being transported in shopping bags. After the exchange, the currency was inspected by a trained narcotics detection K-9. Upon being examined by the K-9, the dog alerted to the positive presence of a controlled substance on the currency. A final count revealed the currency to be exactly \$57,000.

51. After receiving confirmation that the transaction had been completed, LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed CS1 to have the currency deposited into the following bank account:

Standard Chartered Bank
6 Battery Road #03-01, Singapore, 049909
Account
SWIFT - SCBLSG22

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 1
PEDRO CARRASCO
MAY 22, 2014 - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$79,665.00

52. On May 22, 2014, CS1 was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA making use of BBM1 with PIN 2B9515D6 and asked to set up a bulk cash pick-up of \$100,000 of suspected narcotics proceeds in Chicago, Illinois. The security code phrase for this transaction was "Luis de parte de Elkin," and the currency was referred to as "tickets," and later on as "that item." A subpoena was generated for the phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber information with the name "Osbaldo Macias," and a listed address associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone.

53. Subsequently on May 22, 2014, a HSI SAC Chicago undercover agent met with an unidentified Latin male in the parking lot of a shopping mall and picked up \$79,665.00. The Latin male was driving a grey 2000 Nissan pick-up truck bearing Illinois license plate 1274807. This vehicle is registered to Pedro CARRASCO (DOB: 1/28/1962) of 108 South Marilyn, Northlake, Illinois. The transaction was completed by having the UC reach into the passenger's side window of the target's vehicle where he retrieved a green bag containing the currency. The target's vehicle was then followed back to CARRASCO's residence. Surveillance photos were then reviewed and CARRASCO was positively identified as the money courier.

54. After receiving confirmation of the pick-up, CS1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to deposit the cash into the following bank account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited
Hong Kong
Account
SWIFT - HSBCHKHHHKH

55. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 2
LUIS AVILAR HINESTROZA GONZALEZ
JUNE 3, 2014 - HOUSTON, TEXAS
\$163,000.00

56. On June 3, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 using BBM1 to coordinate a bulk cash pick-up of suspected narcotics proceeds in Houston, Texas, in the amount of \$165,000.00. Two phones were used to facilitate this transaction: 832-212-0340, subscribed to via T-Mobile and 713-965-4006, subscribed to via Level 3 Communications. Subpoenas were generated for the subscriber information for each of these phone numbers. A return on the subpoena for 832-212-0340 showed a subscriber with the name Emilo Aristi with a DOB of 07/28/1976, but no address, SSN, or financial information. A records search did not review the existence of any person with this name and date of birth, however, there appears to be an individual with the name Aristi Emilo with a DOB of 07/28/1976, but this person lives in Middlebury, Vermont, and has a phone number with a Vermont area code. A return on the subpoena for 713-965-4006 showed no subscriber information and appears to be a pre-paid phone.

57. When the UC made contact with the courier, a passphrase, "Con Jose de parte de Mateo" was exchanged and the two parties agreed to meet later that day at a Home Depot in South Houston. The UC asked how much money was to be exchanged by asking, "How many gallons," the courier had, to which the courier stated that he would tell him later. In a subsequent conversation the UC told the courier, "I was instructed to pick-up 165 cans of paint," to which

the courier, reassured him not to worry. When asked what vehicle the courier would be driving, the courier was hesitant to give a response, but ultimately stated that he was driving a grey Honda; however, this turned out to be a ruse, as the courier was identified as actually driving a gold Lincoln.

58. The same day a SAC Houston undercover agent met with a black/Latin male in the parking lot of an H-E-B grocery store and received \$163,000.00. The money in question was exchanged without discussion by being shoved into the partially open window of the UC's vehicle. The currency was contained within a black plastic garbage bag.

59. Immediately prior to the transaction, an individual identified as Luis Avilar HINESTROZA GONZALEZ (DOB: 3/25/58) was observed conducting counter-surveillance by HSI personnel. HINESTROZA GONZALEZ was driving a black Nissan registered in his own name; driving slowly back-and-forth in the area and looking into vehicles, observing their occupants. At the moment of the exchange HINESTROZA GONZALEZ had parked his vehicle a few feet away from an HSI surveillance vehicle. As the transaction was taking place, HINESTROZA GONZALEZ exited his vehicle to observe the exchange. Immediately after the bag was stuffed through the UC's vehicle's window, HINESTROZA GONZALEZ was seen talking on the phone and exclaiming, "They have it, they have it!" Thereafter, HINESTROZA GONZALEZ sped off in the direction of the courier's fleeing vehicle. The courier's vehicle was being followed by HSI personnel and was driving in a pattern consistent with counter-surveillance until it arrived at the Little Nell Apartments at 8565 W. Sam Houston Parkway. The courier then entered apartment # 204. While conducting surveillance on the apartment, the black Nissan driven by HINESTROZA GONZALEZ was observed arriving in the parking lot. HINESTROZA GONZALEZ commenced to exit his vehicle and enter apartment # 204.

60. After reporting that the transaction had been completed, LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed CS1 to have the cash deposited in the following bank account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited
Hong Kong
Account
SWIFT – HSBCHKHHHKH

61. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

62. In November of 2015, HINESTROZA GONZALEZ was interviewed by special agents from HSI in Houston, at the apartment he had been seen returning to immediately after the transaction on June 3, 2014. Although he admitted owning the black Nissan in question and stated that he is the sole driver of the vehicle, he denied involvement in bulk cash money laundering. After the interview, agents replayed the phone calls made on the date of the transaction and positively identified HINESTROZA GONZALEZ as the individual who made the phone calls orchestrating the currency drop.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 3
DIEGO PERDOMO
JULY 9, 2014 – NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
\$55,000.00

63. On July 9, 2014, using BBM1, with new PIN 2B980EC5, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 and asked if CS1 could arrange the pickup of \$52,000.00 in Newark, New Jersey. A subpoena was generated for the subscriber information associated with the courier's phone. A return on the subpoena showed that no subscriber information was available and this was a pre-paid phone. Subsequently contact was made with the courier using the passphrase "Tomas de parte de Oscar."

64. Later that day, a SAC Newark undercover agent met with a Latin male who was immediately recognized as Diego PERDOMO (DOB 7/16/1975). PERDOMO is known to HSI agents in New Jersey to operate as a money courier on behalf of an individual named Diego GUZMAN NUNEZ (DOB 9/9/1984) and has been observed on multiple occasions in the past conducting bulk currency transactions in Northern New Jersey. GUZMAN NUNEZ was deported from the United States in 2015, but before being deported was interviewed by HSI agents. During his interview, GUZMAN NUNEZ stated that PERDOMO, as well as other individuals, worked for him delivering U.S. currency and that the currency was derived from cocaine sales being conducted by third parties. The investigation into GUZMAN NUNEZ's organization also showed that he employed a Colombian national named Emis Yohana ESPITIA-HERNANDEZ to Smurf money into banks in the New York/New Jersey area.

65. At approximately 4:30 p.m. PERDOMO entered the parking lot of a Bank of America located on Morris Avenue in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Thereafter, PERDOMO made contact with the UC and handed him a plastic shopping bag containing \$55,000.00 in narcotic proceeds packaged in quick count bundles. LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1 have the cash laundered through the following account:

Teknopark
8750 Doral Boulevard
Doral, Florida, 33178
Account
ABA⁶ CITIUS33

⁶ The American Bankers Association (ABA) is a Washington, D.C.-based trade association for the U.S. banking industry. They are responsible for maintenance of best practices and industry standards for routing numbers of member bank accounts.

66. *This paragraph intentionally left blank...*

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 4
SUBJECT UNIDENTIFIED
JULY 10, 2014 – NEW YORK, NEW YORK
\$40,020.00

67. Also on July 9, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and provided information regarding a money pick up in New York, New York. LIZARAZO MENDOZA asked CS1 to arrange the pick-up of \$60,000.00 in suspected narcotic proceeds. A subpoena was generated for the phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber information with the name "Movie Maker," and a listed address associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone.

68. The following day, July 10, 2014, A1 made contact with the money courier using the passphrase "Luis de parte de Roberto" and the two agreed to meet at the Starbucks at the intersection of 93rd Street and Broadway on the Upper West Side. Later that day an unidentified Latin male entered the Starbucks, made contact with A1 and handed him a white plastic bag containing U.S. currency in quick-count bundles. The Latin male stated that the bag contained approximately \$50,000.00. A subsequent count of the currency revealed it to be \$40,020.00.

69. Upon exiting the Starbucks the subject was followed and observed driving a 2004 Porsche Cayenne. Surveillance units eventually lost contact with the subject vehicle due to the subject's employment of counter-surveillance techniques as he drove.

70. After the transaction was verified, LIZARAZO MENDOZA directed the money be funneled into the following accounts:

Teknopark,
8750 Doral Boulevard
Doral, Florida, 33178
Account
ABA CITIUS33
\$26,180.00

Aiweili Import and Export Limited
1 Queen's Road Central
Hong Kong
Account
SWIFT – HSBCHKHCHKH
\$7,020.00

Dis Cells Corporation
7474 Collins Avenue
Miami Beach, Florida, 33141
Account
ABA 026009593
\$6,000.00

71. HSI/SAC New York was unable to successfully identify the Latin male that conducted the currency drop. The subject was operating a 2004 Porsche Cayenne bearing New York Tag number: FLT 5717. Checks show the vehicle is registered to Josue Ramirez of 22 Ona Lane Apt 1, New Winsor, New York, 12553. A1 viewed a picture of Josue Ramirez obtained via a driving records database and determined that Josue Ramirez was not the individual that dropped the currency at issue.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT CHARLIE
RAUL SANTIZO COLON
JULY 25, 2014 – NEW YORK, NEW YORK
\$104,390.00

72. On July 25, 2014, CS1 was contacted by LIZARAZO MENDOZA regarding a \$100,000.00 contract in New York, New York. The password for the transaction was to be

“German de parte de David.” HSI Miami contacted SAC New York to coordinate the identification of the target in possession of the \$100,000.00. HSI/SAC New York identified Raul SANTIZO Colon (DOB: 7/29/88) acting in a surveillance conscious manner in the area of they believed the money courier would be leaving from in Queens, New York. Upon approaching the target, HSI NY agents obtained consent to search his hotel room and located \$104,390.00 in suspected narcotics proceeds, packaged in quick count bundles in a drawer in the nightstand.

73. A consent search of the target’s phone reveled communications with a third party instructing him to pick-up U.S. currency from an individual on Lexington Avenue in New York and a post pick-up accounting of a little over \$100,000.00. Post-Miranda SANTIZO Colon stated that he had traveled to the United States on business and that he worked for a very dangerous man whom he did not wish to implicate because this individual knows where SANTIZO Colon’s family lives and would not hesitate to harm them in retaliation. Upon arriving in the United States SANTIZO Colon was instructed by his boss to pick up an unknown amount of currency from an unknown third-party. He stated his belief that the currency in question was the product of narcotics sales. Further he stated that he was instructed by his boss to subsequently deliver this money to another unknown individual on today’s date. SANTIZO Colon said that, prior to the incident in question, he had never conducted a money pick-up, however, a records check revealed that he had been stopped several years prior to this incident by police in Providence, Rhode Island, with \$15,000.00 hidden in his car. SANTIZO Colon is a Guatemalan citizen visiting the United States on a B1-B2 visa.

74. On August 20, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and requested assistance in picking up approximately \$50,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois, of suspected

narcotic proceeds. This contract was canceled before any contact was made with the HSI/SAC Chicago undercover agent.

75. Money laundering contracts may be canceled for different reasons. As a Colombia-based money launderer, LIZARAZO MENDOZA bids for money contracts from individuals that have narcotics dollars for sale in the United States. LIZARAZO MENDOZA competes with other money brokers for these contracts. If LIZARAZO MENDOZA is awarded a contract, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacts CS1, or another member of his organization, to arrange the pick-up of the narcotics dollars. There is always a possibility that another money broker bids lower than LIZARAZO MENDOZA (mid-coordination period) and the contract is given to another money broker, and his/her contact in the United States will pick up the currency. There are other times where the money broker offers the contract to a few different money brokers. In such a case, the organization that can pay out the pesos in Colombia first tends to receive the contract.

76. On August 28, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately \$50,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia. This contract was canceled before contact was made with the HSI/SAC Atlanta undercover agent.

77. On September 2, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately \$170,000.00 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The unidentified Latin male was utilizing phone number: 978-701-1330. The contract was canceled prior to any meeting between a SAC/Philadelphia HSI undercover agent and target.

78. On September 2, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately \$100,000.00 in Boston, Massachusetts. The target in Boston turned off his phone and the contract was canceled. The contract was canceled prior to any meeting between a SAC/Boston HSI undercover agent and target.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 5
JESUS VALENCIA
SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$67,000.00

79. On September 4, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately \$100,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois. This pick up was coordinated with HSI/SAC Chicago. On September 8, 2014, the serial number of a dollar bill was provided to LIZARAZO MENDOZA and in exchange he provided a passphrase: "Ruben de parte de Pedro." Additionally, a subpoena was generated for the courier's phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber information with the name "James Avery," and a listed address associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone.

80. On September 9, 2014, a HSI/SAC Chicago UC met with an unidentified Latin male in a Macy's parking lot. This individual was later identified as Jesus VALENCIA, (DOB: 6/15/1982). A records check revealed that VALENCIA has an extensive criminal history, including, including an outstanding warrant in California for "Crimes Against Persons," and was previously arrested in that state with over \$400,000.00 U.S. currency and a firearm, while attempting to purchase 18 kilograms of cocaine. On the date in question, VALENCIA dropped a

red bag containing \$67,000.00 to the HSI UC. A subsequent K-9 sniff of the currency delivered by VALENCIA revealed the presence of the odor of a controlled substance.

81. After verification of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1 have the cash laundered through the following accounts

M2 wireless Inc.
7254 NW 31st Street
Miami, Florida 33122
Chase Bank
ABA: 267084131
Account:
\$30,000.00

Grand Metropolitan Limited
208 Queen's Road Central
Hong Kong
HSBC, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH
Account:
\$35,660.00

82. On October 8, 2014, a mobile surveillance was established on VALENCIA and he was observed traveling with a black backpack. He was eventually driven to a Wells Fargo bank and made a single deposit of \$9000.00. Upon exiting the bank, HSI agents engaged him in a consensual encounter with VALENCIA and the individual who had driven him to the bank, Steve CERVANTES. Permission was given to search the vehicle and agents located VALENCIA's black backpack, which revealed a single quick count bundle containing approximately \$20,000.00 in U.S. currency and two bags of cannabis. In addition to the currency and controlled substance, additional deposit receipts were located showing that six days prior, on October 2, 2014, two other deposits of \$9000.00 each had been made within ten minutes of each other into the same account at a different Wells Fargo branch and that one hour later, an additional \$9000.00 had been deposited at Bank of America. A fifth receipt was also

located showing that the following day, October 3, 2014, another \$9000.00 deposit had been made at Bank of America. When asked about the receipts VALENCIA admitted that he had been instructed to pick-up large amounts of bulk U.S. currency and deposit them \$9000.00 at a time to avoid bank reporting requirements. He stated that he could not state with certainty how the currency was generated, but assumed it was the product of narcotics sales.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 6
SUBJECT UNIDENTIFIED
OCTOBER 3, 2014 – NEW YORK, NEW YORK
\$49,980.00

83. On October 2, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of \$100,000.00 in New York, New York. The pick-up was coordinated with HSI/SAC New York. A subpoena was generated for the courier's phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber information with the name "Juan Velez," and a listed address associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone. The passphrase for the contract was to be "Marcelo de parte de Tio."

84. On October 3, 2014, a UC made contact with the money courier and the two agreed to meet later that day at the Pathmark grocery store at 410 West 207th Street, in Manhattan. Shortly thereafter, an unidentified Latin male walked up to the UC's vehicle and delivered approximately \$49,980.00 in a black duffle bag. The subject then left the location on foot and proceeded to a nearby gas station where he met up with a second subject and, ultimately was picked up by a third subject driving a gray Honda Odyssey. Surveillance was maintained on the subjects' vehicle, however due to the employment of counter-surveillance techniques law enforcement eventually lost contact with the vehicle. To date the subjects remain unidentified.

85. Upon verification of the transaction, CS1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to deposit the cash into the following bank account:

Times Trading Inc.
1145 SW 23rd Avenue
Miami, Florida, 33135
Account
ABA 062005690

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 7
JOSE ANGEL CORTEZ RAQUEZ
OCTOBER 6, 2014 – ATLANTA, GEORGIA
\$214,900.00

86. On October 3, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 via BBM1 and requested assistance in coordinating a pick-up of approximately \$150,000.00 in suspected narcotics proceeds in Atlanta, Georgia. A subpoena was generated for the courier's phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed no subscriber information or address. This was a pre-paid phone.

87. On October 6, 2014, an undercover HSI TFO from SAC Atlanta spoke with the courier responsible for delivering the money. During the brief conversation the passphrase, "Raul de parte de Agua," was exchanged and the courier informed the UC that he would be providing \$220,000.00 instead of the previously agreed up \$150,000.00. Shortly thereafter, the two parties spoke again and the courier again attempted to change the terms of the exchange to include a larger amount of currency, however, the UC declined to pick up more than the \$220,000.00 previously agreed upon. Later that same day, a HSI SAC Atlanta UC picked up what was later determined to be \$214,900.00 packaged in quick-count bundles, in a Costco parking lot in the Atlanta area. The UC observed the courier retrieve the currency from a hidden compartment located behind the rear seats of the courier's vehicle. The courier then requested

that the UC place the currency into a black bag inside the courier's vehicle before transferring it to the UC vehicle. HSI SAC Atlanta subsequently identified the individual in question as Jose Angel CORTEZ Raquez/Raques/Raquel (DOB: 1/30/1987).

88. After the pick-up, CS1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to deposit the cash into the following bank accounts:

Times Trading Inc.
1145 SW 23rd Ave.
Miami, Florida 33135
Account:
ABA: 062005690
\$40,602.00

Times Trading Inc.
1145 SW 23rd Ave.
Miami, Florida 33135
Account:
ABA: 062005690
\$40,000.00

Times Trading Inc.
1145 SW 23rd Ave.
Miami, Florida 33135
Account:
ABA: 062005690
20,000.00

Grand Metropolitan Limited
208 Queens Road Central
Hong Kong
Account:
SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH
\$70,000.00

LDN Technology USA
10773 NW 58th Street, #248
Miami, Florida 33178
Account:
ABA: 031101266
\$40,000.00

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 8
ALONSO RIVERA VALENZUELA
OCTOBER 15, 2014 – DETROIT, MICHIGAN
\$62,920.00

89. On October 9, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing BBM1, with new PIN 2A8671DD, contacted CS1 and requested assistance in coordinating the pick-up of approximately \$150,000.00 in suspected narcotic proceeds in Detroit, Michigan. A subpoena was generated for the courier's phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed no subscriber information or address. This was a pre-paid phone. CS1 was instructed to accept the contract and, thereafter, HSI Miami received and passed on to HSI Detroit, a phone number of the money courier.

90. On October 10, 2014, an HSI Detroit UC made contact with the courier and they agreed to conduct the transaction the following week. During the conversation, the passphrase "Alonso de parte de Luis," was exchanged.

91. On October 15, 2014, the UC spoke with the courier over the phone. During the call, the courier stated that he did not want to speak over the phone because a few of his "friends" had recently been "busted" and he was only willing to communicate via text. The two subsequently agreed to handle the currency exchange in the parking lot of a Home Depot. When the courier arrived at the Home Depot he informed the UC that he was nervous and believed that he was being followed. He then told the UC that he only had \$65,000.00 and handed the UC an Igloo Playmate cooler containing the funds in question. The currency was then exchanged and the parties exited the location.

92. A mobile surveillance was established on the subject's vehicle which was eventually followed back to a Mexican restaurant called "El Asador" located on the corner of Springwells and Mint Street, in Detroit. The subject exited the vehicle and was observed

entering the apartment located directly above the restaurant, which has a single white door as an entrance just south of El Asador's main entrance. In the following days, a consensual encounter was conducted at the apartment in question and the courier was positively identified as Alonso RIVERA VALENZUELA (DOB: 08/25/1983); a Mexican national carrying a Mexican federal identification card.

93. A final count of the currency picked up on October 15 came out to \$62,920.00. Once the transaction had been verified, CS1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to deposit the cash into the following bank accounts:

Titos Depot Corporation
3300 NW 112 Avenue, Suite 9
Doral, Florida
Account:
ABA: 031101266
\$20,000.00

LDN Technology USA
10773 NW 58th Street, #248
Miami, Florida 33178
Account:
ABA: 031101266
\$25,000.00

Maxpoint USA
8259 NW 66th Street
Miami, Florida
Account:
ABA: 026009593
\$16,662.00

94. On October 16, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing BBM1, contacted CS1 and requested assistance in coordinating the pick-up of approximately \$100,000.00 in suspected narcotic proceeds in Detroit, Michigan. LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided the following number: 313-595-4507. This contract was not accepted by CS1. HSI/SAC Miami provided this

information to HSI/SAC Detroit. HSI/SAC Detroit made efforts, but was ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to identify the subject utilizing phone number: 313-595-4507.

95. On October 18, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing BBM1, contacted CS1 and requested assistance in coordinating the pick-up of approximately \$100,000.00 in suspected narcotic proceeds in New York, New York. HSI/SAC Miami coordinated with HSI/SAC New York to assist in identifying the target in New York, however, ultimately, the contract was canceled.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 9
JAVIER CASTRO LEYVA
ROBERTO LOPEZ MORALES
DUVAN BOLANOS MORA
FABIO MORENO
NOVEMBER 10, 2014 - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$95,000.00

96. On November 7, 2014, using BBM1, LIZARAZO MENDOZA offered CS1 a contract to pick up \$120,000 in Chicago, Illinois. LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided a "David de parte de Jorge," as the passphrase. HSI SAC Miami Group 17 Strike-force agents and MDPD detectives made contact with HSI Chicago and advised them of the investigation. HSI Chicago utilized an undercover agent to make contact with the courier via telephone and confirmed a meeting for November 10, 2014, at a shopping mall. The courier in question was using telephone number 480 469 0726.

97. On November 10, 2014, two couriers met with a UC and gave the UC \$95,000.00, which had been transported in a brown satchel, which further contained a white Armani Exchange bag. After the transaction a narcotics detecting K-9 gave a positive alert to the currency.

98. After confirmation of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed CS1 to deposit the cash into the following account:

DISCELL Corporation
7474 Collins Ave.
Miami Beach, Florida
Account
ABA 0260095933

99. After the transaction was completed, the couriers were followed back to the Raffaello Hotel at 201 East Delaware Place, in Chicago, and identified as Javier CASTRO LEYVA (DOB: 3/12/88) and Roberto LOPEZ MORALES (DOB: 5/20/87). Both subjects are Mexican nationals, traveling under Mexican passports.

100. On November 15, 2014, HSI Agents in Chicago returned to the Raffaello Hotel and approached CASTRO LEYVA and LOPEZ MORALES as they were exiting the hotel with a tan satchel which was observed to contain a large bundle of U.S. currency. After a brief interaction, CASTRO LEYVA and LOPEZ MORALES were asked for consent to search their room and cell phones, which they both agreed to, signing written consent forms. While in the room, CASTRO LEYVA spontaneously stated, "We have a problem," and immediately followed up by inquiring about his custody status. The subjects were told that they were not under arrest, but both men were Mirandized and signed written Miranda forms.

101. After signing the Miranda forms, CASTRO LEYVA was asked what the problem he had been referring to was. He then stated while in Chicago he was asked by an individual by the name of Justino GONZALEZ to pick-up bulk U.S. currency on behalf of an individual by the name of Victor GONZALEZ. He further stated that J. GONZALEZ is V. GONZALEZ's nephew. J. GONZALEZ's instructions were to pick-up \$130,000.00 from an unknown individual whom CASTRO LEYVA described as a Mexican who sounded like he was from the

State of Michoacán. Upon searching the hotel room, agents discovered a backpack and other bags with a large amount of US Currency and documents supporting money laundering activities that were being conducted. CASTRO LEYVA stated that he believed the currency was most likely the product of narcotics sales and that he had often heard V. GONZALEZ's associates discussing narcotics transactions. Both CASTRO LEYVA and LOPEZ MORALES made statements that the currency was not theirs and signed proper abandonment forms. The currency, which totaled \$130,000.00, was seized as the proceeds of illicit narcotics sales and subsequently inspected by a narcotics detection K-9 unit who alerted to the presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

102. While conducting surveillance at the money drop conducted on November 10, 2014, HSI Chicago observed a vehicle occupied by two (2) unknown males who later were identified as Duvan BOLANOS MORA (DOB: 5/21/90) and Fabio MORENO (DOB: 7/10/93) conducting counter-surveillance. HSI Chicago conducted surveillance on BOLANOS MORA and MORENO and followed them to an Extended Stay America hotel located in Des Plaines, Illinois. Thereafter, BOLANOS MORA and MORENO exited their vehicle with a backpack and what appeared to be a very heavy duffle bag, which seemed to have contained a square object, and entered the hotel. Later that evening, HSI Chicago agents made a consensual encounter with the two men, who were in their hotel room at the time of the approach. Both BOLANOS MORA and MORENO provided verbal and written consent to search their room, vehicle, and cell phones. Upon searching the hotel room, HSI Chicago agents observed a shoe box on the couch containing a large amount of US Currency. Both BOLANOS MORA and MORENO later made statements that the currency was not theirs and signed proper abandonment forms. The currency

in question, which totaled \$124,990.00, was seized by HSI Chicago as the suspected proceeds of illicit narcotics sales.

103. After the search, the subjects agreed to be interviewed by HSI and signed written Miranda waiver forms. BOLANOS MORA stated that he traveled from Cali, Colombia, to Hialeah, Florida, in July 2014, to visit his friend (“cousin”) Fabio MORENO. In Cali, BOLANOS MORA owns an electronics import business called J.M.A. Comunicaciones, located in the Diamante building⁷. He stated that he imports products from the United States for resale in Colombia for his business and on behalf of other similar businesses. In order to accomplish this he stated that interested business owners in Colombia would give him large amounts of U.S. currency in the form of bulk cash to take with him to the United States, to purchase products, such as iPhones, which would then be shipped back to Colombia. When questioned regarding the identity of the businesses and business owners he was holding the \$124,990.00 for, he could not give any names, stating that someone in Colombia that he knew only as “Andres” had sent him to Chicago to pick up the currency. Moreover, when questioned about past businesses and individuals he had worked with, he was again unable to provide any names.

104. BOLANOS MORA went on to state that while in the United States, he had been contacted by an unknown Latin male with a Dominican accent who told BOLANOS MORA that a cell phone needed to be delivered to him. BOLANOS MORA then met with the unknown Latin male who provided him with a brand new LG telephone with a single BlackBerry contact installed in it, with the name “Andres.” A review of the communications on this phone showed communications between “Andres” and BOLANOS MORA consistent with BMPE transactions. For example, on November 3, 2014, “Andres” sent a message that consisted of only a phone

⁷ The Diamante Building is also the operational base for LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA.

number and the number, the word “Esmerlada,” and the number “150,” indicating the courier to call, the code-name of the location of the pick-up, and the amount of money in question. On November 5, 2014, “Andres” sent a message consisting of only a phone number, the words “in Houston,” and the number “130.” On November 8, 2014, “Andres” sent a message consisting only of a phone number and the number “125.”

105. Under further questioning, BOLANOS MORA admitted that the November 8, 2014, communication had prompted him to call an unknown individual, fly to Chicago with MORENA, and pick up the \$124,990.00 that was seized in the hotel room. He stated that upon arrival in Chicago MORENO rented a car and they checked into a motel room. After getting settled, contact was made with a Mexican money courier and he and MORENO then drove to the pick-up location. He further indicated that they received money in a red duffle bag in person from a man they did not know who said only one thing to them, “I’m leaving you in charge of this.” After receiving the money he and MORENO returned to the motel room and together they counted and repackaged the money into \$2000 bundles that BOLANOS MORA was to deposit it into various bank accounts as directed by “Andres.” A further search of the phone revealed numerous messages from “Andres” with bank account information and dollar amounts to be deposited.

106. A subsequent detailed analysis of the data extracted from the LG phone in BOLANOS MORA’s possession revealed additional evidence of money laundering both in the form of financial transactions made to disguise the nature of the proceeds and “structuring” or “Smurfing,” which are transactions designed to avoid reporting requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act. Moreover, the communications showed “Andres” explaining codes to BOLANOS MORA. In a communication sent on November 3, 2014, “Andres” stated:

“TT is your house” (referring to New York; the TT code stands for Twin Towers)

“The R is where you were yesterday” (referring to Chicago; the R code stands for the Spanish word for wheel, which is rueda – a reference to the large Ferris wheel on Chicago’s Navy Pier)

“Hospital is Houston”

“The stadium is Atlanta”

“Dtr is Detroit”

107. Further translated examples of instructions used for money pick-ups located on BOLANOS MORA’s phone include:

“513-550-4366 on behalf of the white guy. This is the number of Cincinnati.”

“And this is the one for the 40 from the R [Chicago] 333-957-4132 ask for the dollar or the attorney.”

“604-652-5940 satacha on behalf of the little black guy.”

“604-396-8606 Tomas. Ask if the woman finally delivered the 160 yesterday. If they ask what was the code tell them Tomas on behalf of Steven.”

“But the thing is the cucho from Guadalajara has 130 for me in TT [New York].

Then call 908-248-3993. Omega on behalf of the little wolf.”

108. In addition to the pick-up instructions, the phone contained directions to deposit over \$360,000.00, in seventy-seven (77) separate deposits to fifty-three (53) different businesses and individuals over a period of (12) days. The list of businesses included numerous Florida based businesses, such as Jr. Unlimited, Miami City Wireless, Mas Communications Tec., Carbon Fiber Entertainment, Latch Shoe Corp., O.C. Trading Inc., OGL LLC., all of whom are

located or operate in Miami-Dade County. Of the seventy-seven deposits, more than ninety percent were indicative of structuring, by limiting the transaction to \$10,000.00 or less. Further evidence of structuring was evinced by the fact that many of the businesses and individuals received multiple deposits of \$10,000.00 or less on the same date, into the same account, which makes no sense from a business perspective, but is a hallmark of structuring transactions.

109. In spite of the evidence to the contrary, contained in his phone, BOLANOS MORA denied ever having picked up money in the United States, with the exception of the money located in his hotel room.

110. On November 18, 2014, BOLANOS MORA was again interviewed, this time by HSI agents in Miami, Florida. Post-Miranda, he stated that he was actually sent to the United States by someone he knew only as “Burjo,” and that “Burjo” had instructed him to travel from Hialeah to New York City and await instructions from someone he had never met before known to him only as “Andres.” He stated that MORENO accompanied him on this trip, as well as on a trip to Chicago, the week before. He was then asked about the phone that was given to him by the unknown Latin male in New York City, which had a BBM with a username “KAWAGA.” BOLANOS MORA stated that he didn’t know the significance of the name KAWAGA and that it was pre-programed into what was an otherwise brand new phone, still in its original packaging. He added that after the November 10, 2014, seizure, he threw that phone away and has lost all contact with “Burjo.”

111. At the inception of the interview, BOLANOS MORA was insistent that other than the \$124,990 he pick-up up in Chicago, he had never picked up money for anyone else in the United States. Later in the interview when he could not explain all of the banking transactions detailed in his phone, BOLANOS MORA stated that all of these deposits were done pursuant to

“Andres’s” instructions for money picked up by someone he did not know named “Esmeralda” in New York.

112. When questioned about who the money seized in Chicago belonged to, BOLANOS MORA stated that he did not know, but that eventually someone would expect him to repay the loss, but he did not know who or when that would happen. When asked about family and friends, BOLANOS MORA identified several individuals, including his step-father, whom he said was Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, born on May 8, 1982. He also identified an individual he referred to as “WALLASS” whom he said was well known for working in the Diamante Building in Cali and that WALLASS would know who “Andres” was.

113. Subsequently, a source of intelligence from within the money laundering community in Cali, Colombia, identified BOLANOS MORA as working directly for CASTRO SANTANA and being in charge of one of CASTRO SANTANA’s store fronts in the Diamante Building where money laundering activities were coordinated. BOLANOS MORA and MORENO’s actions in remaining in the parking lot on the date in question are consistent with conducting counter-surveillance on behalf of LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA after making a pick-up for them. Large pick-ups are often broken up into smaller amounts in order to protect the currency from robbery and law enforcement interdiction. In such a case, for additional security, a member of the organization receiving the currency may act as a spotter on behalf of the broker they work for in Colombia, keeping him or her apprised of the status of the transaction or notifying him or her of the presence of suspicious individuals or law enforcement.

114. On December 1, 2014, using BBM1, LIZARAZO MENDOZA offered CS1 a contract to pick up \$130,000.00 in Cincinnati, Ohio. This contract was accepted and HSI

Cincinnati made contact with the money courier using phone number 513-356-0442. Upon making contact with the money courier, a location was agreed upon to conduct the pick-up, however, throughout the day, the courier changed the pick-up location on several occasions, which is consistent with his organization attempting to manipulate a situation for the purpose of establishing counter-surveillance. The presence of counter-surveillance could have jeopardized the pick-up in question and, more importantly, ultimately, frustrated the goals of this investigation. Accordingly, HSI contacted LIZARAZO MENDOZA via CS1 and cancelled the contract.

115. On December 2, 2014, HSI Miami began intercepting communications from BBM1 pursuant to a court order signed by the Honorable Ellen Sue Venzer on November 26, 2014.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 10
EDI ACOSTA GAMEZ
DECEMBER 5, 2014 – DETROIT, MICHIGAN
\$200,000.00

116. On December 4, 2014, Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, using the moniker “PEDRITO” used BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6 (“BBM2” from hereafter) to contact BBM1, inquiring if LIZARAZO MENDOZA could coordinate a money pick-up of \$200,000.00 in Detroit, Michigan. LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 to inquire his/her availability to pick up the money in Detroit. CS1 then passed this information on to HSI Miami who instructed CS1 to accept the contract. Upon accepting the contract CASTRO SANTANA sent the courier’s phone number (313-805-7393) and passphrase “Eduardo de parte de Javier,” to LIZARAZO MENDOZA, who subsequently passed the information along to CS1. CS1 provided HSI Miami with the number and pass phrase, which were employed by an HSI UC in Detroit who ultimately

coordinated the pick-up. A subpoena was generated for the courier's phone's subscriber information. A return on the subpoena showed fictitious subscriber information with the name "Andre Perez," and a listed address associated with the Sprint Corporation in Los Angeles, California. This was a pre-paid phone.

117. On December 5, 2014, HSI Detroit met with the courier, later identified as Edi Alonso ACOSTA GAMEZ⁸ (DOB: 11/11/82) in a Home Depot parking lot. At the initial meeting, the courier stated that he did not have the money, but would return with it shortly. The courier was followed by law enforcement personnel, but, ultimately, surveillance had to be terminated because the subject was engaging in counter-surveillance techniques as he drove.

118. An hour and a half later, ACOSTA GAMEZ returned to the Home Depot parking lot and provided the UC with two shoe boxes containing a total of \$200,000.00. After exchanging the currency, the courier was again followed by law enforcement personnel and observed conducting numerous counter-surveillance techniques as he drove.

119. Once the transaction was verified, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed on wire instructions to CS1 to deposit the money into the following business accounts:

Titos Depot Corporation
3300 NW 112 Avenue, Suite 9
Doral, Florida
Account:
ABA: 03110101266
\$64,050.00

DISCELL Corporation
7474 Collins Ave.
Miami Beach, Florida
Account
ABA 0260095933
\$131,950.00

⁸ For further details on this subject, see Paragraph 127 through Paragraph 133 below.

120. On December 7, 2014, an individual using the name "MERCK" employing BBM PIN 2BAA7EF4 contacted BBM1 to request assistance in picking up \$100,000.00 in New York City. Thereafter, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 to inquire his/her availability to pick up the money in question. CS1 passed this information on to HSI Miami who instructed CS1 to accept the contract. In this case, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested CS1 pass him the number of the individual who would be picking up the money on CS1's behalf. CS1 passed along an undercover number for an HSI agent in Miami to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then passed this number along to MERCK. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then used BBM1 to give both MERCK and CS1 the pass phrase that would be used to conduct the pick-up. HSI Miami then waited for a phone call from MERCK's courier. That same day, HSI Miami received a call from 475-243-4218 to coordinate the pick-up. The user of number 475-243-4218 identified himself as operating out of Northern New Jersey; accordingly, HSI Miami reached out to HSI Newark to handle the physical pick-up. HSI Newark made contact with the courier who cancelled the contract. Over the course of intercepting communications on the wire, it was determined that the courier had cancelled the contract because he believed the HSI Newark UC to be of Dominican descent. Criminals of Dominican descent in the New York/New Jersey area are known for conducting robberies of bulk cash pick-up. This is believed to be the reason for the courier's hesitance to conduct the transaction with someone he believed to be Dominican.

121. Also on December 7, 2014, CASTRO SANTANA used BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6 to contact LIZARAZO MENDOZA on BBM1 to request assistance in picking up \$200,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois. Thereafter, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 to inquire as to his/her availability to pick up the money in question. CS1 passed this information on to HSI Miami, who instructed CS1 to accept the contract. Again, in this case, LIZARAZO MENDOZA

requested CS1 to pass him the number of the individual who would be picking up the money on CS1's behalf. CS1 passed along an undercover number for an HSI agent in Miami to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then passed this number along to CASTRO SANTANA. The HSI UC in Miami received a phone call from a money courier using 585-409-3793. HSI stalled the money pick-up, in an attempt to use the courier's phone number to locate the money before the pick-up and engage in an interdiction operation. Because HSI stalled the pick-up, the courier ultimately cancelled the contract.

122. On December 8, 2014, pursuant to the judicially authorized wire interception for this case, HSI began discerning a significant concern among LIZARAZO MENDOZA and the other money brokers in Colombia regarding the possibility that their phone lines were being monitored by law enforcement. Communications were intercepted regarding changing both BBM PINs and SIM cards. Additionally, they discussed turning their phones off. In addition to LIZARAZO MENDOZA, the following individuals were parties to these conversations: F/N/U L/N/U utilizing BBM PIN 22A7D6B3, JEAN PAUL, and WPPK.

123. On December 10, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA discontinued use of PIN 2A8671DD and began using PIN 2B984748 to coordinate his money laundering contracts. This PIN was received by contacting CS1, who had continued to receive communication from LIZARAZO MENDOZA without interruption, in spite of the change of BBM PINs.

124. On December 10, 2014, on the new BBM PIN associated with BBM1, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested CS1 to assist with picking up \$120,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois. The number for the money courier, 708-261-2817, along with the pass phrase "de parte del mago," meaning "on behalf of the magician," was passed along to CS1. HSI Miami reached out to HSI Chicago to conduct an undercover pick-up. When HSI Chicago reached out

to the courier, the UC identified himself as calling on behalf of “mago.” The courier was insistent that the UC come to the courier’s residence and count the money, which they referred to as “tickets.” The money courier also stated that there would be “150 tickets” to pick up, instead of the amount contracted for, which was \$120,000.00. HSI was not comfortable sending an undercover agent into a private location in which they could not exercise any control, because of the high threat of violence associated with narco-trafficking and money laundering. The UC attempted to get the courier to change locations for the pick-up and the courier indicated that he would have to speak to his “boss” who was “down south.”

125. Approximately one hour later the UC called the courier back. The courier again asked whom the UC was calling on behalf of, to which the UC again responded, “Mago.” The courier then informed the UC that there was a new code and to call him back if he was able to get it from his people. A serial number from a dollar bill was then provided to the UC as the new passphrase. After exchanging the new code, a series of conversations ensued, but, ultimately the parties could not agree on meet location that was acceptable to their respective “bosses” and the HSI UC cancelled the contract.

126. Throughout the day on December 10, 2014, LIZARAZO MENDOZA was in communication with CS1 regarding possible money pick-ups in Atlanta, Georgia, and Montreal, Quebec. BBM1 was used for these communications.

127. On December 11, 2014, surveillance was conducted on Edi ACOSTA GAMEZ, the money courier from the December 5, 2014, Detroit transaction. A traffic stop was eventually initiated for the purpose of fully identifying the subject. During the traffic stop, ACOSTA GAMEZ told the officer that he had borrowed the vehicle he was driving from a friend and was on his way to the friend’s apartment to return the vehicle. Subsequent to the traffic stop,

surveillance continued and instead of returning to an apartment and returning the vehicle, ACOSTA GAMEZ and his passenger, Jenady Alexis MEDINA OLIVAS (DOB: 4/24/85), drove to a Target store and were observed searching through the trunk of their vehicle and crawling beneath the undercarriage of the vehicle with a flashlight. Your affiants are aware that such behavior is consistent with a professional drug trafficker or money courier inspecting their vehicle for the presence of a mobile tracking device used by law enforcement to keep tabs on the subject's movements. Thereafter, the subjects drove to a nearby restaurant and upon exiting the restaurant repeated the previously described search of the vehicle. Next the subjects drove to a nearby GameStop store and, again, upon exiting the location engaged in a search of the vehicle.

128. Shortly thereafter, the subjects were observed entering an apartment in Southfield, Michigan. A consensual encounter was then conducted at the apartment. The subjects were Mirandized and stated that they were in the United States to for the purpose of visiting some friends and to go shopping. ACOSTA GAMEZ possessed a valid visa, however, MEDINA OLIVAS had entered illegally. The two claimed that the apartment belonged to a friend of theirs by the name of "Arturo" who lived in Mexico and that the keys had been provided to them in a restaurant by a woman whom they could not name. A subpoena for the records of the apartment in question showed that it was currently being rented by a woman named Catherine Dufour, not the aforementioned "Arturo." Contact with Ms. Dufour led to her declining to speak with law enforcement and having her attorney, Marvin Smith, stating that he would set up a meeting with Ms. Dufour at a later date.

129. After speaking with the subjects, agents received written consent to search the residence, which appeared to be a "stash-house," used to hold bulk-cash prior to laundering it. Inside the residence agents discovered a false wall cut into the drywall behind a bathroom mirror.

Inside the wall they discovered numerous notes which contained dollar amounts written on them, indicative of the location being used for surreptitiously storing money for later distribution. Further search of the residence revealed a money counter used for processing bulk-currency, ledgers, rubber-bands, money wrappings, \$16,537.00 in small denominations, a closet full of empty shoe boxes, and approximately 20 to 25 cellular telephones, each with the battery removed and a calling card rubber-banded around it. Collectively these items are the functional analogue to an illegal money courier's apothecary; providing all necessary items for the prosecution of his craft and evincing a long-standing status as a "professional" in this field.

130. When confronted with the evidence and asked for "Arturo's" contact information, the subjects stated that they did not have any contact information for "Arturo," then invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. Prior to leaving the residence, HSI property abandonment forms were signed by each subject, stating their lack of proprietary interest in the items seized.

131. ACOSTA-GAMEZ is a Mexican national from the State of Sinaloa who entered the United States in October of 2014 on foot via San Ysidro. He has no criminal history in the United States and refused to cooperate. He has no known permanent address, driver's license, or bank account.

132. MEDINA-OLIVAS is Mexican national illegally residing in the United States. He has no criminal history in the United States and refused to cooperate. He has no known permanent address, driver's license, or bank account.

133. On December 18, 2014, a lab report for latent fingerprints revealed the presence of ACOSTA GAMEZ's prints on the exterior of the shoe boxes used to transport the currency picked-up by HSI Detroit on December 5, 2014.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 11
SIDIA MILADY LIZARAZO MENDOZA
ALEJANDRO LEON VEGA
DECEMBER 23, 2014 – MIAMI, FLORIDA
\$174,440.00

134. On December 22, 2014, A1's phone number was provided to Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA, by CS1 to coordinate a pick-up with an individual in Miami, Florida, for \$175,000. This individual was later identified as Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA. Subsequently A1 received a phone call Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA (DOB: 4/21/76), using phone number 404-997-9208 and employing the passphrase, "Sebastian Valentina." A subpoena for the subscriber information associated with this phone revealed that it was subscribed to under a fictitious name, "Paulo Perez," with a date of birth of April 30, 1958, and no listed address or payment information. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested to meet that same day. A1 instructed her that he was unavailable at the moment, but could meet her the following day.

135. On December 23, 2014, at approximately 8:00 a.m. A1 received a call from Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA using the same target number. She requested to meet with A1 earlier than initially anticipated. A1 suggested meeting with the target at the Dolphin Mall in the City of Doral, however, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA declined to meet there because she believed there were too many people at that location. A1 agreed to meet with her at approximately 1:00 p.m. at a Starbucks in Doral. In place of A1, MDPD UC, Detective Gil Crespo, met with Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, however, she was not aware that Detective Crespo and A1 were actually two different individuals. When Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA arrived, she gave Detective Crespo a bag containing a shoe box with \$174,440 in U.S. currency, packaged in quick count bundles.

136. Thereafter, Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions to CS1 to have the money wired to the following account:

Movil Singapore, Ltd.
6 Battery Road
#03-01
Singapore, 049909
Account
Swift SCBLSG22
\$170,951.00

136. Based on information subsequently documented in this affidavit, it is believed that the money dropped off in Miami had been originally picked up in Atlanta, Georgia, by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and her husband, Alejandro LEON VEGA (DOB: 3/4/81). Although LEON VEGA was not seen during the course of this transaction, he is known to assist Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA in illegally transporting currency, as is detailed in the January 30, 2015, transaction discussed below, and he can be linked to this transaction in the following ways:

1. LEON VEGA's credit card was used to purchase two one way plane tickets to Atlanta the week of this transaction.
2. LEON VEGA and Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA were the passengers listed on the tickets for the flight to Atlanta.
3. Immediately upon arriving in Atlanta, LEON VEGA's credit card was used to rent a vehicle, which promptly returned to South Florida the following day.
4. LEON VEGA's phone number (404) 955-0972 was used as the contact information for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.
5. LEON VEGA's email address yancha04@hotmail.com was used as the contact information for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.

6. During A1's phone call directly before the pick-up, a male voice could be heard asking Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA about the transaction.
7. When Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA dropped the money off, she was driving a 2011 Toyota Camry with New Jersey plate number UUX20T. That license plate was traced back to a Toyota Camry owned by and registered to LEON-VEGA.

137. The methods of travel associated with Sidia Milady LIZARAO MENDOZA and LEON VEGA's trip are inconsistent with legitimate business activity or personal business, however, they are consistent with the fashion in which BMPE couriers move money prior to depositing it with a financial institution. Flights are used to travel to the location where the money is being housed, but cars are almost exclusively used for the return trip to the courier's base of operations, because public transportation, especially air travel, exposes the courier to security personnel, drug and currency detecting K-9 units, X-ray screenings, etc.

138. Additionally, the times of travel are inconsistent with legitimate business activity or personal business. The vehicle was rented at 12:30 a.m. on December 19, 2014. It was returned in Ft. Lauderdale at 12:30 a.m. on December 20, 2014. This left precious little time for anything other than sleep while in Atlanta.

139. Finally, the planning of the travel is inconsistent with legitimate business activity or personal business. The airline tickets were purchased the same day as the flight and the rental car was not secured until after arrival in Atlanta.

140. On January 3, 2015, HSI and MDPD again began intercepting communications from Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA's BBM PIN pursuant to a court order signed by the Honorable Ellen Sue Venzer on December 24, 2014.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 12
AMBRIORIS ACOSTA DE LA CRUZ
JANUARY 6, 2015 – NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
\$197,984.00

141. On January 5, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1 accept a contract for \$200,000, in New York. A2 instructed CS1 to accept the contract and subsequently passed this information on to HSI in New York. A phone number for a HSI UC in New York was passed the number to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number along to the along to the target. The following day, the HSI UC received a phone call from 347-987-2044. The passphrase, “Wilder de parte de Jaime,” was exchanged at the front end of the conversation. The caller stated that he could not drive and had no means of getting to New York, so the two agreed to conduct the transaction the following day in Northern New Jersey, at a strip mall located at 632 State Street, in Perth Amboy.

142. On January 6, 2015, the HSI UC picked up \$197,984.00 from an unknown Latin male who was traveling on foot. This individual was subsequently identified as Ambrioris ACOSTA de la CRUZ (DOB: 9/8/74). The currency was contained within a box designed to house an Xbox gaming system, being transported inside of a shopping bag. It was further wrapped in an interior plastic bag and then divided into quick-count bundles which were either wrapped in plastic-wrap or tightly packaged and sealed within zip-lock bags. ACOSTA de la CRUZ was subsequently followed back to an apartment building at 169 Hall Street, in Perth Amboy, but the unit he entered could not be identified.

143. After verifying the completion of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions to CS1 to have the money wired to the following accounts:

Hair and Accessories, Inc.
4620 NW 125th Street
Opa Locka, FL 33054
Account
ABA 121000248
\$11,000.00

Inversiones Recug Ca
Ave. Lara Calle 8 Centro Commercial
Barquisimento, Venezuela
Account
ABA 067015779
\$40,000.00

Tecknopark USA
10773 NW 58th Street,
Miami, FL 33178
Account
ABA 266086554
\$68,684.00

LDN Technology USA
10773 NW 58th Street,
Miami, FL 33178
Account
ABA 067014822
\$32,120.00

Jeffrey Cohn
211 5th Avenue,
New York, NY 10017
Account
ABA 026009768
\$14,000.00

IMES
3585 NW 107th Avenue,
Doral, FL 33178
Account
ABA 067014822
\$28,221.00

144. On January 10, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1 accept a contract for \$200,000, in New Jersey. A2 instructed CS1 to turn down the contract.

145. On January 11, 2015, a New York UC received a call from an unknown Hispanic male utilizing telephone number 347-987-2044. The UHM requested to meet at the same location as the previous pick-up which occurred on January 6, 2015. The UC advised the UHM he/she would get back to him. The UC then disabled his UC telephone at the request of HSI Miami.

146. On January 13, 2015, A2 observed a communication between CASTRO SANTANA, using BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6 and LIZARAZO MENDOZA, inquiring if LIZARAZO MENDOZA could coordinate a money pick-up of \$200,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia. LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the number of 404-997-9208 to CASTRO SANTANA signifying that the user of this phone was available to pick up the requested currency. This is the same number used by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA when she dropped off \$174,440 in Miami, in December. A pen register and trap and trace device were employed on the phone used by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and a mobile tracking device was placed on LEON VEGA's vehicle to gather evidence and track their movements. The phone in question was only being used in a very limited capacity, consistent with a phone being used for compartmentalized illegal activity. In fact, this phone was often shut-off for days at a time, then briefly turned back on, which, again, is consistent with a phone being used for the limited purpose of conducting an illegal money drop.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 13
FRANCISCO HARO RODRIGUEZ
JANUARY 15, 2015 – CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$84,780.00

147. On January 14, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1 accept a contract for \$90,000.00, in Chicago. This contract had been given to LIZARAZO MENDOZA by CASTRO SANTANA on January 13. A2 instructed CS1 to accept the contract and subsequently A2 passed this information on to HSI in Chicago, Illinois. A phone number for a HSI UC in Chicago was passed to MOQUERA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number along to the owners of the currency and provided CS1 with the passphrase, “con mollo departe de Panzon,” which loosely translates to “with the dark-skinned one, on behalf of the potbellied.” Later that day, the HSI UC received a phone call from 872-218-1560 from an individual who stated that he was calling on behalf of “Panzon” and wished to speak to “Mollo.” This individual, subsequently identified as Francisco HARO RODRIGUEZ (DOB: 3/1/89) discussed dropping off a “package,” with the UC the following day. The UC asked how many “tickets” there were and HARO RODRIGUEZ responded, “eight, five.”

148. On January 15, 2015, the HSI UC picked up \$84,780 in a white plastic Disney shopping bag from HARO RODRIGUEZ in a mall parking lot outside of Chicago. The currency was concealed inside of a box contained in the Disney bag and was packaged in bundles wrapped in bubble packaging. A latent fingerprint matching HARO RODRIGUEZ’s left ring finger was subsequently developed from the box containing the currency. After the transaction, a trained narcotics detecting K-9 unit alerted to the presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

149. After verification of the transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions to CS1 to have the money wired to the following account:

Global Honest Enterprises Limited
208 Queens Road Central
Hong Kong
Account:
SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

150. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 14
SIDIA MILADY LIZARAZO MENDOZA
ALEJANDRO LEON VEGA
JANUARY 30, 2015 – MIAMI, FLORIDA
\$199,740.00

151. On January 30, 2015, MDPD Robbery Detective Dave Richards advised that at approximately 3:45 a.m., the telephone belonging to Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA was shutdown. Immediately prior to being turned off, the phone was located on Miami Beach, in Miami, Florida. Det. Richards advised that at 10:30 a.m., Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's telephone turned back on inside Atlanta International Airport, in Atlanta, Georgia. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA called telephone number 404-901-8592, then made a brief stop at a shopping center in the Atlanta area. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's telephone was then tracked traveling south towards Miami. A2 then received information from CS1 that Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA would be calling our UC phone number from telephone number 404-997-9208 at or around 8:00 p.m. to coordinate a money drop of \$200,000.00, and that the passphrase would be "Mariana de parte de Victor."

152. At 7:45 p.m., A1 received a call from Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA but did not answer. MDPD Robbery Detective Jason Gambill advised that, based on the tracking capabilities associated with the pen register and trap and trace device attached to Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's number, the phone was still heading towards the South Florida area. MDPD and HSI agents mobilized and headed toward the area of the Ft. Lauderdale International Airport, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Upon arrival, A1 observed Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, Alejandro LEON-VEGA and a third individual, Felipe GIRALDO, dropping off a rental car and picking up the vehicle previously driven by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, the 2011 Toyota Camry, which was still registered to LEON-VEGA, but now with Florida tag BJAЕ16.

153. At approximately 9:15 p.m., a mobile surveillance was established on the subjects' vehicle until a marked MDPD Police vehicle, being driven by Officer Raul Bacallao, conducted a traffic stop for an improper lane change in the area of 164th Street and Collins Avenue, in Sunny Isles Beach, Miami-Dade County, Florida. Upon Officer Bacallao making contact with all occupants of the vehicle, he observed the occupants to be extremely nervous and concerned about the traffic stop. Officer Bacallao obtained verbal consent to search the vehicle from LEON-VEGA who is the owner of the vehicle. Upon searching the vehicle, Officer Bacallao observed a backpack and a smaller bag with a large amount of U.S. currency in quick count bundles. Officer Bacallao then notified A1 of the results of his search. Upon arrival, A1 made contact with all parties involved. The subjects were read Miranda per form by A2 and each waived their Fifth Amendment rights.

154. Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA was subsequently interviewed by A2 and SA Xavier Martinez stated that they had flown to Atlanta that morning, rented a car, driven to a

Walmart, and received the currency from an individual using the name "Victor," with an unknown last name, and driven directly back to Miami. She stated that the money was hers and that she was going to use it to purchase cell phones to be exported to Cali, Colombia. She also acknowledged having a bank account with Bank of America, but did not explain why she chose to fly to Atlanta to pick up the currency, as opposed to having it place into her account. She also failed to explain why she took the risk of driving with \$200,000 from Atlanta to Miami, when she could have simply deposited the currency at any one of the numerous Bank of American branches in Atlanta.

155. According to Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, the purpose of the trip to Atlanta was to pick up the currency in question. She stated that she did not know anything about the individual who delivered the currency, but that he was a Mexican named Victor and that he arrived at the Walmart parking lot in a taxi cab, handed her a bag, which contained the \$200,000, and that he promptly left without either party requesting or receiving a receipt or any other form of documentation to establish that the currency exchange took place. When asked for details regarding the customer whom she would be shipping the cell phones to, she stated that it was a new client. When pressed further, she admitted that she did not know the name of this client and did not have any contact information for this client.

156. During the course of the interview, a MDPD Narcotics Detection Canine Unit, being handled by Detective Jorge Rodriguez, was brought on scene and positively alerted to the presence of narcotics on the U.S. currency. At this time, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA appeared increasingly nervous and stated that she was not the true owner of the money and that it belonged to an individual named Andres RODRIGUEZ, although she did not provide any additional information substantiating the existence or identity of this person.

157. After speaking with Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, A2 and SA Xavier Martinez interviewed LEON VEGA. He stated that he was traveling with his fiancé, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, so that they could deliver wedding invitations for their friends and family in Georgia. He stated that the wedding was to take place on February 14, 2015, and that they were to give the invitations to his mother, at a Walmart parking lot in Atlanta. When asked about the currency in the vehicle, LEON VEGA stated that he had no idea how it came into Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's possession, but that it belonged to her cell phone exportation business. He made no mention of meeting a Mexican named Victor or picking up currency while in Atlanta.

158. Next, Felipe GIRALDO was interviewed. GIRALDO described the purpose of the trip as a quick vacation. He stated that he believed they had met LEON VEGA's mother at a Walmart in Atlanta, but that he had never seen her while they were there. He stated that after the stop at the Walmart, the trio immediately started driving to Miami. Regarding the currency, GIRALDO stated that he had no idea how it came into Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's possession and had not seen anyone deliver anything to her while they were in Atlanta, but that he believed it belonged to her cell phone export business.

159. Prior to releasing the subjects, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's cell phones were seized. A phone extraction was conducted pursuant to her consent on what was determined to be her personal phone. This phone contained contact information for many of the individuals being intercepted on the wiretap being conducted on Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA's BBM PIN. The other phone was an outdated model, similar to a tracfone, which was incapable of being extracted. A search of this phone was also conducted pursuant to Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA's consent, revealing a similar contacts list, and showed

communications associated with the money pick-up conducted in Miami, Florida, on December 23, 2014, and with the money pick-up conducted in Atlanta, Georgia, earlier in the day.

160. Subsequently, each subject signed a property abandonment form in regards to the U.S. currency. This seizure was processed by HSI Miami Group 17.

161. While Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA is the direct point of contact for the Colombian money brokers under investigation, LEON VEGA's culpability in this transaction is apparent for the following reasons:

1. The day before the scheduled pick-up three plane tickets for Atlanta were purchased, one of which was in the name of LEON VEGA.
2. The tickets were one-way.
3. Immediately upon arriving in Atlanta, LEON VEGA's credit card was used to rent a vehicle, which promptly returned to South Florida the same day.
4. LEON VEGA's phone number (404) 955-0972 was used as the contact information for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.
5. LEON VEGA's email address yancha04@hotmail.com was used as the contact information for the rental car agency when the vehicle for this trip was booked.
6. After returning the rental car, LEON VEGA's vehicle was used to transport the \$200,000 which had been picked up in Atlanta.
7. While on scene, LEON VEGA admitted that he knew the money was in the car, but claimed that he had no idea how it came into their possession.
8. This was the second time in approximately one month that LEON VEGA had followed this same course of behavior, traveling to Atlanta by air, immediately

returning by car, and then employing his personal vehicle to facilitate a BMPE transaction.

162. Among other things, it stretches the limits of credulity to believe that LEON VEGA would have traveled to Atlanta on such short notice, in such a circumspect fashion, to drop off invitations to a wedding that was taking place in a mere two weeks' time, with his mother. It also makes no sense that they did not stay in Atlanta for more than a couple of hours, meet somewhere other than a Walmart parking lot, and that they chose to drive all the way back to Miami from Atlanta. Moreover, the fact that both Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and GIRALDO gave entirely different accounts of the purpose of the trip – to pick up currency and a vacation, respectively – shows LEON VEGA's intent to hide his involvement and knowledge of the illegality of the conduct⁹.

163. The day following the seizure, January 31, 2015, around 9:30 a.m., CASTRO SANTANA ceased using BBM PIN 2BBDBFC6. This fact was discerned from the lack of activity appearing on the pen register and trap and trace device attached to CASTRO SANTANA's BBM.

164. Sometime shortly thereafter, Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA ceased using BBM PIN 2B984748. According to CS1, Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA told him that he dropped his BBM PIN because the phone used by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, which had been used to coordinate multiple money pick-ups, had been seized by law enforcement. Your Affiants

⁹ Further indicia of Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and LEON VEGA's criminal culpability was documented when MDPD, in conjunction with HSI SAC Miami, executed a search warrant for a phone located in the couple's shared residence in September of 2015. That device contained BBM communications from February of 2015 discussing the fact that an attorney named Oscar was looking into a seizure – this is consistent with information intercepted over the wire in February of 2015, which showed that a Miami based attorney, Oscar Rodriguez, has been used by the owners of the currency to look into this seizure. The communications also indicated that "bandidos," a/k/a "*bandidos criminales*," a term used in Colombia to refer to professional kidnappers and murderers, were harassing one of them and that they were afraid. One particular communication directs the party on the other line to lie to law enforcement if interrogated and to provide fake names, telephone numbers and BBM PINs. Subsequently, both parties to the communication express fear of going to jail.

believe CASTRO SANTANA dropped his phone for the same reason, which is reasonable in light of the fact that CASTRO SANTANA was the source of each of the contracts accepted by Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, and supported by communications between Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA which are described in detail below. Regardless, CS1 advised that Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA was now using BBM PIN 2B96469A.

165. On February 2, 2015, HSI Miami began intercepting communications from BBM PIN 2B984748 pursuant to a court order, however, because LIZARAZO MENDOZA had ceased using this BBM PIN, these communications consisted only of individuals attempting to communicate with LIZARAZO MENDOZA and an abject lack of responses on the part of LIZARAZO MENDOZA. BlackBerry was requested to immediately begin supplying HSI with interceptions on the new BBM PIN being used by LIZARAZO MENDOZA, however, due to delays in BlackBerry's legal department, interception did not commence for roughly one week and the first interception on the new BBM PIN was not received until February 10, 2015.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 15
AMBORIS ACOSTA DE LA CRUZ
FEBRUARY 5, 2015 – NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
\$150,150.00

166. On February 3, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1 accept a contract to pick-up \$150,000, in Newark, New Jersey. A2 instructed CS1 to accept the contract. A UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number along to the target. Later that day, A1 received a phone call from 732-824-9539, in which the passphrase "Mauricio de parte de Jorge" was exchanged. That individual

discussed meeting with A1 on Thursday, February 5, 2015, in New Jersey to drop off the money. A1 then traveled to Newark, New Jersey, to conduct this pick-up.

167. On February 4, 2015, A1 received a phone call from 732-824-9539, in which the caller stated the agreed upon passphrase. The caller advised that he would meet A1 at 1:00 p.m., at a Dunkin Donuts. The caller then sent A1 an address, 632 State Street, Perth Amboy, New Jersey, via text message, as the pick-up location for the transaction. This was the same address as the transaction conducted on January 6, 2015.

168. On February 5, 2015, A1 acting in the undercover capacity responded to 632 State Street, to meet with the money courier. Upon A1's arrival, the courier approached on foot and made contact with A1. This individual was subsequently identified as the same courier from the January 6, 2015, transaction, Ambioris Antonio ACOSTA de la CRUZ. ACOSTA de la CRUZ gave A1 a heavy black gym bag which contained \$150,150.00 in US Currency. ACOSTA de la CRUZ did not speak to A1, other than to state, "via con Dios," meaning may God be with you, as he walked away. HSI Newark then followed ACOSTA de la CRUZ back to the same apartment building located at 169 Hall Avenue, and were able to discern that ACOSTA de la CRUZ lived within Unit 1. Subsequently, A1 was shown a driver's license photo of ACOSTA de la CRUZ and positively identified him as the money courier.

169. After the transaction was verified, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions to CS1 to have the money wired to the following accounts:

ATI Solutions
8273 NW 66 St
Miami, FL 33166
Account
ABA 121000248
\$60,000.00

Alimentos la Fontana c.a.
Calle Marino sur N. 104
Maracay, Venezuela
Account
ABA 067010509
\$87,137.00

170. On February 8, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 on BBM1 and requested that CS1 pick up \$190,000.00 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A2 ultimately instructed CS1 to fain various scheduling conflicts to avoid having to accept this contract.

171. As previously stated, on February 10, 2015, HSI Miami began intercepting communications on LIZARAZO MENDOZA's new BBM PIN, 2B96469A, pursuant to this court's roving interception order.

172. On February 17, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA used BBM1 to communicate with CRISTO, who employs BBM PIN 52FB6349. LIZARAZO MENDOZA reached out to CRISTO regarding a quote for laundering money via a frequently used business owned by Lillian Lucero LARREA. CRISTO replied that Lucero LARREA was no longer a reliable associate, stating that Lucero LARREA had been approached by federal agents, whom LIZARAZO MENDOZA and other members of the extended conspiracy refer to as "amigos," (Session 5309) which is the Spanish word for "friends." Thereafter, CRISTO told LIZARAZO MENDOZA, "Y a un senior. Que tenie negocios con ella le llegaron cartas del las tres letras," (Session 5328) which translates to, "And a guy that had business with her received correspondence from the three letters," which is a veiled reference to an American federal law enforcement agency, such as the FBI, DEA, ATF, or HSI. In response to this information, LIZARAZO MENDOZA told CRISTO that he needed someone new to work with in Lucero LARREA's place. CRISTO told LIZARAZO MENDOZA that an individual named "ARIEL" could provide the necessary services. CRISTO asked for a name to pass along to ARIEL, to

which LIZARAZO MENDOZA replied “Carlos.” CRISTO specifically noted that he had worked with ARIEL in the past and that ARIEL had funds available, referred to as “Fabric” (Session 5414) via Hong Kong, referenced as “HK” (Session 5414).

173. Later on February 17, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA sent a BBM request to ARIEL, which was subsequently accepted. LIZARAZO MENDOZA and ARIEL then discussed the sale of cell phones and payment to an HSBC account in Hong Kong (Session 5680). During their conversation LIZARAZO MENDOZA verified his location as being in Cali, Colombia, (Session 5555) while ARIEL identified his location as Miami, Florida (Session 5530). ARIEL also discussed the safest methods of depositing money into accounts in Hong Kong in light of current financial regulations (Session 5549).

174. Analysis of BBM conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA, utilizing BBM: 2B96469A as “Jacobo” and ANA MARIA, utilizing BBM: 2B972736, as “Mariana,” shows that they are discussing Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA and that Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA and Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA are communicating using Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA’s assistant, ANA MARIA, as an intermediary.

175. On February 20, 2015, (Session 9249) LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised an individual that works for him under the BBM moniker “ANA MARIA” to tell LIZARAZO MENDOZA to “call the lawyer, that he just spoke to him, and she has not told him how all the events occurred. That she only answered the questions the lawyer asked her. Have her call him to set up a meeting. That she should not tell the attorney that they rented a car and that they were returning the car in Miami because it would make them expose themselves.¹⁰” Subsequently (Session 9268), LIZARAZO MENDOZA asked through ANA MARIA, “Who should I call?

¹⁰ This is a direct English translation of the communication in question.

Oscar Rodriguez?¹¹” It is believed that Oscar Rodriguez is an attorney that TADEO has hired to find out what happened to the \$200,000.00 that was seized from LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA.

176. Thereafter (Session 9277), Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised ANA MARIA to tell Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA to tell Oscar Rodriguez everything she told the “Homeland” people, referring to HSI. Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA responded to ANA MARIA by instructing her to tell LIZARAZO MENDOZA that the lawyer himself, “Tony,¹²” told Oscar that the agents said that there were some anonymous calls, that they “ratted on us; I am talking to lawyers, writing documents and my family is here asking what is happening.¹³” (Session 9286) Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed ANA MARIA to tell Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA that nothing is right and that he, LIZARAZO MENDOZA, should come up to Miami and help her (Session 9287). Ivan LIZARAZO MENDOZA responded through ANA MARIA that he will handle it from Colombia (Session 9290).

177. On February 23, 2015, CS1 received a communication from LIZARAZO MENDOZA using BBM1 requesting that he pick up \$100,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia. A2 instructed CS1 to accept the contract. A UC number was then passed to CS1 who passed the number to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. Pursuant to the current wire intercept it was determined that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was offered the contract via TUNES, who employs BBM PIN 2BD4FFF4. This contract was ultimately cancelled because LIZARAZO MENDOZA and TUNES could not agree on an exchange rate for the pesos and dollars involved in the transaction.

¹¹ This is a direct English translation of the communication in question.

¹² “Tony” is believed to refer to Attorney Tony Alvarez, whom LIZARAZO MENDOZA had hired to represent her in this matter.

¹³ This is a direct English translation of the communication in question.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT DELTA
AMBIORIS ACOSTA DE LA CRUZ
FEBRUARY 27, 2015 – NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
\$183,595.00

178. On February 27, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA used BBM1 in communications with Hugo BOSS to coordinate a \$200,000.00 money pick-up in New York, New York. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then offered this contract to CS1. Pursuant to instructions by HSI Miami, CS1 accepted this contract, however, no phone number or pass phrase were ever exchanged.

179. Subsequent to the above referenced communications, at 6:45 p.m., on February 27, 2015, HSI New Jersey conducted a seizure of \$183,595.00 by surveilling Ambioris Antonio ACOSTA de la CRUZ, the money courier responsible for the transactions conducted on January 6, 2015, and February 5, 2015. ACOSTA de la CRUZ was seen meeting with two individuals in front of the Dunkin Donuts in the strip mall located at 632 State Street, in Perth Amboy; the same location that ACOSTA de la CRUZ had used to conduct the January 6, and February 5, money drops. ACOSTA de la CRUZ was seen passing a black duffel bag to an individual subsequently identified as Ruddy Haroldo PINTO SIGUENZA, who placed the bag into the bed of a pick-up truck and departed.

180. Shortly thereafter, a traffic stop was conducted on the pick-up truck being driven by PINTO SIGUENZA. PINTO SIGUENZA and the passenger Luis Enrique ORELLANA PEC were asked for consent to search the vehicle. Pursuant to their consent, agents located the black duffel bag that had been passed from ACOSTA de la CRUZ to PINTO SIGUENZA and observed it to be filled with U.S. currency packaged in quick-count bundles. Neither PINTO SIGUENZA nor ORELLANA PEC could adequately explain the reason for their trip or the presence of the currency, which was subsequently seized.

181. On March 6, 2015, HSI Miami continued intercepting communications on LIZARAZO MENDOZA's new BBM PIN, 2B96469A, pursuant to this court's roving interception order which was signed on March 4, 2015.

182. On March 6, 2015 at approximately 21:08 hours HSI/SAC Miami intercepted several communications between BBM PIN 2bbf2cce, used by an individual named MONTILLA SAMBONI, known as "ALFARITO," and BBM PIN 2b77daed, used by CASTRO SANTANA. During these communications, ALFARITO sent a transcript of his conversation with an individual identified as "TADEO." TADEO appears to be the owner of the \$199,740.00 that was seized in Miami on January 30, 2015. TADEO stated that ALFARITO's brother-in-law (referring to CASTRO SANTANA) was refusing to pay him, that the blame for the seizure was with CASTRO SANTANA's people, and that CASTRO SANTANA should pay to avoid compounding his problems. TADEO stated to ALFARITO that they will send the bill to the "office," which is believed to be a reference to "La Oficina de Envigado," a/k/a "La Oficina," which is a Colombia-based bill collecting organization, specializing in kidnapping, murder, and extortion, used by narco-traffickers to collect debts owed.

183. The transcript sent from ALFARITO to CASTRO SANTANA showed the following exchange, translated from Spanish into English, between TADEO and ALFARITO:

TADEO: "I can certainly assure you that you are going to have a big problem for being such RATS."

ALFARITO: "My man, you know that we are not thieves. With all due respect."

TADEO: "Just leave it like that. When they have them tied up, do not ask for their release, because you will see how a collection is done."

184. TADEO also stated that he would show them who had the power and would make them pay. During the conversation, ALFARITO continually referred to TADEO as “sir,” showing a respect of or fear for this person. This conversation was clearly in reference to TADEO turning collection of the debt for the seized money over to professional kidnappers. In response CASTRO SANTANA contacted LIZARAZO MENDOZA to continue on to discuss the need for them to establish the culpability of a third party for the seized money. As described in a subsequent section of this affidavit, a little more than a month later, La Oficina would make an approach on LIZARAZO MENDOZA while CASTRO SANTANA was conveniently out of sight.

185. On March 7, 2015, a conversation between CASTRO SANTANA using the “ANTONIO” BBM PIN and moniker and LIZARAZO MENDOZA using the JACOBO BBM PIN and moniker was intercepted in reference to the \$200,000.00 seizure in Miami, Florida, on January 30, 2015. They were trying to figure out if law enforcement was following their courier from Atlanta or if the source of the law enforcement action originated in Miami. Further, they stated that they needed the lawyers working the matter to get some form of paperwork or information showing who was responsible for law enforcement interdicting the money. CASTRO SANTANA also advised LIZARAZO MENDOZA that the owners of the money still want to get paid. They then discussed the money being narcotics proceeds and that they needed to find out who was at fault, because one of them would be held responsible for the seized money. LIZARAZO MENDOZA reassured CASTRO SANTANA that his people (LIZARAZO MENDOZA, et. al.) have not lied to him. He also stated that he has paid a good amount of money retaining an attorney to make sure that Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA did not get deported.

186. On March 10, 2015, a conversation between NOSTRADAMUS ACERO and LIZARAZO MENDOZA was intercepted in reference to a \$210,000.00 contract in which they talked about breaking up the \$210,000.00 into three payments of \$70,000.00 apiece. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then sent to NOSTRADAMUS ACERO a telephone number 305-333-1017 and the name Lilian Tech Cell, referring to Lilian Lucero LARREA, and the pass phrase of “de parte de el cliente de Carlos Atortua.” LIZARAZO MENDOZA told NOSTRADAMUS ACERO that Lucero LARREA has an account in Hong Kong and to put the whole \$210,000.00 into that account.

187. On March 11, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1, accept a contract to pick-up \$100,000.00 in New York, New York. HSI instructed CS1 to accept the contract. An HSI New York UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number along to the target. LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised CS1 that he needed an office to conduct the pickup. HSI was unable to obtain an office location so the contract was cancelled.

188. On March 11, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1, accept a contract to pick-up \$100,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois. HSI instructed CS1 to accept the contract. An HSI Chicago UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA. In turn, LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number along to the target. This contract was cancelled prior to HSI receiving a phone call from the target money courier.

189. On March 13, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested that CS1, accept another contract to pick-up \$100,000.00 in Chicago Illinois. HSI instructed CS1 to accept the contract. An HSI Chicago UC number was passed to LIZARAZO MENDOZA via CS1. This contract was also cancelled prior to HSI receiving any phone call.

190. On March 16, 2015, A2 observed a conversation between CHUCHO (2BBF59F2) and LIZARAZO MENDOZA talking about \$200,000.00 in Guatemala. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then reached out to numerous individuals in an attempt to find a business partner for the contract. This conversation between CHUCHO and LIZARAZO MENDOZA ended because they could not come to agreement on the cost of the dollar.

191. On March 16, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA had a conversation reference a bank account belonging to a "Margarita Rosa Bedoya." LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the account number to VITO CORLEONE and advised to deposit there. After further investigation, it is believed that Ms. Margarita Rosa Bedoya was born in Colombia on 08/25/1964 and has a Non-Immigrant B1/B2 visa. Ms. Bedoya has traveled to the United States on several occasions to conduct business. Ms. Bedoya has no criminal history in the United States, no known address, no driver's license or vehicles registered in her name, and has no readily discernible ties to LIZARAZO MENDOZA.

192. On March 20, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and NOSTRADAMUS ACERO had a conversation reference to contracts in multiple locations. They discussed \$100,000.00 in Guatemala and \$71,000.00 in San Diego, California. NOSTRADAMUS ACERO also stated that he had \$50,000.00 in Manhattan, in New York City, at the rate of 2100. NOSTRADAMUS ACERO also asked for the address, telephone number, and name of a business or office in Manhattan.

193. On March 20, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and FRENCH MONTANA had a conversation reference a money contract in New York, New York. LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised FRENCH MONTANA he had \$200,000.00 for cash on delivery with the same man from

before. FRENCH MONTANA responded by stating that he could not help because business has been slow since January.

194. Also on March 20, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and FRENCH MONTANA had a conversation reference a money contract in Tijuana, Mexico, for \$500,000.00. No further information was received reference this contract.

195. On March 21, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CHUCHO had a conversation reference a money contract for \$400,000.00 in Guatemala. LIZARAZO MENDOZA further advised CHUCHO the \$400,000.00 was cash on delivery. No further information has been received reference this contract.

196. On March 23, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and JUNIOR had a conversation reference a money contract of \$100,000.00 in Houston, Texas. JUNIOR asked LIZARAZO MENDOZA for the number (possibly referring to telephone number) for the \$100,000.00. JUNIOR then sent LIZARAZO MENDOZA the serial number to a dollar bill along with a pass phrase. The passing of a serial number is common practice used when a contract is given. LIZARAZO MENDOZA further advised JUNIOR he was going to send \$50,000.00, but was waiting to receive the full amount. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then reached out to CS1 regarding CS1's availability to pick up this money. CS1 was instructed to accept this contract, which he did. This information was passed to HSI Houston for further investigation, but ultimately, this contract was cancelled.

197. On March 25, 2015, FRENCH MONTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA had conversation reference to a money contract for \$50,000.00 in New York, New York. FRENCH MONTANA sent LIZARAZO MENDOZA the serial number and pass phrase. No further information was received in reference to this contract.

198. Also on March 25, 2015, CARRO and LIZARAZO MENDOZA had a conversation reference to a money contract for \$150,000.00 in Atlanta, Georgia. CARRO and LIZARAZO MENDOZA discussed the exchange rate. No further information was received in reference to this contract.

199. Later on March 25, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and EL FENIX discussed a money contract in Guatemala for \$200,000.00. No further information was received in reference to this contract.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 16
GISCARD YOHSIATI PENA PENA
APRIL 13, 2015 – BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
\$126,280.00

200. In April of 2015 LIZARAZO MENDOZA offered CS1 a contract to pick up \$150,000.00 in Boston, Massachusetts. A phone number and passphrase, “Mauricio de parte de Luis,” was provided to HSI SAC Miami, who, in turn, provided that information to HSI SAC Boston.

201. On April 13, 2015, an HSI SAC Boston UC made contact with the money courier who answered the phone by stating, “I am here until 4:00 p.m.” The courier then gave the UC an address in the Hyde Park neighborhood of South Boston. Later that afternoon the UC traveled to the agreed upon location and meet with the courier, subsequently identified as Giscard Yohsiati PENA PENA (DOB: 06/25/1977). PENA PENA was observed exiting the right front door of one of the units located at 298 Wood Avenue. He then approached the UC’s vehicle carrying a white plastic shopping bag. PENA PENA opened the passenger’s side door of the UC’s vehicle, placed the plastic bag on the floor and told the UC that it contained approximately \$126,000.00. A final count of the currency showed it to be \$126,280.00.

202. After the transaction was verified, LIZARAZO MENDOZA provided instructions to CS1 to have the money wired to the following account:

Global Honest Enterprises Limited
208 Queens Road Central
Hong Kong
Account:
SWIFT: HSBCHKHCHKH

203. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia¹⁴. As will be discussed below, in May, PENA PENA was arrested in connection with narcotics trafficking and money laundering activities being investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

204. On April 16, 2015, a conversation between EL FENIX (2BD91A68) and LIZARAZO MENDOZA was intercepted in which LIZARAZO MENDOZA advised that he had \$170,000 available to be picked up in Spain. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then sent this same message to six other of his contacts in an attempt to sell this contract.

The Aborted Kidnapping of Lizarazo Mendoza

205. On April 17, 2015, a conversation between CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA was intercepted in which CASTRO SANTANA appeared to have

¹⁴ The Operation Neymar wiretaps were terminated in May of 2015. At that time, a determination was made to significantly slow down the enforcement operations undertaken, while performing investigative follow-ups and preparing this affidavit and its associated charging documents. Throughout 2015 and until being approached by HSI and the Panamanian National Police on February 29, 2016 – *as described below* – LIZARAZO MENDOZA continued to offer work to CS1 on a regular basis in the form of scores of money laundering contracts, however, those instances are not specifically described herein as they are unnecessary to establish probable cause.

tricked LIZARAZO MENDOZA into going to a meeting at a local bar, where members of La Oficina were lying in wait, to collect the \$200,000 debt they owed. On behalf of CASTRO SANTANA, an individual known as MAKARIO, a/k/a "The Man in Red," was sent to the meeting to act as an intermediary and advise CASTRO SANTANA of the outcome.

206. The conversation started out with CASTRO SANTANA telling LIZARAZO MENDOZA that he was going south and wanted to meet at "the cabin." Approximately forty-five minutes later LIZARAZO MENDOZA asked CASTRO SANTANA if he was there already, and stated, "Remember, we said 5:00 pm." LIZARAZO MENDOZA then said that he was there "in the cabins." He then asks CASTRO SANTANA, "Where are you?" CASTRO SANTANA replied, "At the little bar." LIZARAZO MENDOZA then told CASTRO SANTANA that he was outside of "Addidas." CASTRO SANTANA told LIZARAZO MENDOZA, "I am at the little bar outside of Valez." When LIZARAZO MENDOZA arrived, he asked CASTRO SANTANA again, "Where are you?" CASTRO SANTANA then replied, "I'll be right there." LIZARAZO MENDOZA then told CASTRO SANTANA, "You said you would be here." In response, CASTRO SANTANA told him that he was in the bathroom. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then said, "Oh buddy," to which CASTRO SANTANA replied, go ahead and explain to them, "the man in red" knows the whole thing very well.

207. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then asked CASTRO SANTANA to come over and aid in his defense. He stated that there were a great number of people present and pleaded to CASTRO SANTANA, "How can you let me die?" CASTRO SANTANA replied that LIZARAZO MENDOZA needed to explain everything to the men present at the bar.

208. At 8:01 p.m., LIZARAZO MENDOZA told CASTRO SANTANA that the men agreed not to kidnap him. CASTRO SANTANA asked what they said, to which LIZARAZO

MENDOZA replied that it was bad and that CASTRO SANTANA should have warned him so that he could have gotten ready and brought someone to protect him.

209. Afterwards, CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA continued to speak in reference to who was at fault for the money seized in Miami, Florida, on January 30, 2015. CASTRO SANTANA told LIZARAZO MENDOZA, "you picked the money up, it is your responsibility." LIZARAZO MENDOZA then responded by telling CASTRO SANTANA that the police activity was generated in Georgia and was the fault of the organization/money couriers who dropped the money off with them.

210. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then asked CASTRO SANTANA to speak with EL CALVO and see how much he would charge to buy him some time to arrange for payment. CASTRO SANTANA told LIZARAZO MENDOZA that EL CALVO would need 20,000, "so they could give you a break and he will manage everything for you so you don't have to show face, because they will grab you while we wait for the invoices and documents to see who is at fault." CASTRO SANTANA advised that the 20,000 was just a break but, "they need to know when you will be receiving the document and if the documents show that it is your fault, then you have to pay the whole thing."

211. On April 18, 2015, a conversation between CASTRO SANTANA and MAKARIO was intercepted in reference to the previous day's meeting between La Oficina, MAKARIO, and LIZARAZO MENDOZA. MAKARIO told CASTRO SANTANA that at the beginning of the meeting La Oficina said that \$325,000 was owed. MAKARIO then clarified that it was \$200,000. MAKARIO told CASTRO SANTANA that at the meeting he had told LIZARAZO MENDOZA that La Oficina had already determined not to collect from CASTRO SANTANA, but they would not do the same for LIZARAZO MENDOZA and that they needed

their money. CASTRO SANTANA asked, "Dude, what if that guy doesn't want to come out and what would happen if that man [LIZARAZO MENDOZA] suddenly says that nothing will be sent?" MAKARIO responded by saying, "No, dude, I'm telling you, and I'm very clear about this, I'm your friend, but neither you nor him can go out again for anything in the world. Those men already told me what the whole conversation was about. . . . Although that guy [LIZARAZO MENDOZA] keeps saying that it's in *centro*, things got complicated and they were ready to kill the guy yesterday. It would be better to do our best to resolve this matter peacefully. I tried to contact Trini yesterday, but that would also involve a lot of expenses and that's the problem with all these things."

212. Also on April 18, 2015, a conversation between SEAN JOHN and LIZARAZO MENDOZA was intercepted in which SEAN JOHN was asking for \$200,000 in Boston and wanted to know what rate he could receive for his services. LIZARAZO MENDOZA responded with a rate of 2110 peso per dollar. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then reached out to CS1 who was instructed to accept the contract. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then passed a telephone number and passcode "617-648-7268" and "German de parte de Victor," respectively, to SEAN JOHN. HSI Boston was contacted with the information, but, ultimately, this contract did not come to fruition.

213. On April 20, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and SEAN JOHN was intercepted in which LIZARAZO MENDOZA was solicited SEAN JOHN to pick up \$500,000 in Guatemala, however, it is unknown if this contract was ever completed.

214. On April 24, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and SEAN JOHN was intercepted where SEAN JOHN asked LIZARAZO MENDOZA for \$100,000 in New York. LIZARAZO MENDOZA agreed to the transaction and SEAN JOHN told him to pass a phone number. Shortly thereafter LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed the phone number

“347-380-9624” and passphrase “Nestor de parte de Arejo.” All pertinent information in reference to this contract was given to HSI New York in an attempt to locate and identify targets, however, no interdiction could be made.

215. On April 27, 2015, another conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and SEAN JOHN was intercepted in reference to a \$200,000 contract in Boston, Massachusetts. LIZARAZO MENDOZA passed SEAN JOHN the following phone number “617-765-4550” and passphrase “Alfredo de parte de Pedro.” HSI Boston was contacted and all information was forwarded, but, again, no interdiction could be made.

216. On April 27, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA was intercepted in which LIZARAZO MENDOZA asked if CASTRO SANTANA had money in New York, Chicago, or Mexico. CASTRO SANTANA replied that he was “laying low.”

217. Later on April 27, 2015, a conversation between LIZARAZO MENDOZA and SEAN PAUL was intercepted where LIZARAZO MENDOZA told SEAN PAUL that there was \$500,000 available in Montreal for pick up and asked SEAN PAUL what his rate was. Ultimately, this contract was not completed.

218. On May 7, 2015, DEA New England Field Division arrested Giscard Yohsiati PENA PENA, the money courier who had delivered \$126,280 to a HSI SAC Boston UC on April 13, 2016. The DEA’s arrest of PENA PENA was the result of a narcotics trafficking and money laundering ring being investigated separately from HSI’s Operation Neymar. At the time of the take down, the subjects had \$173,000.00 with them. A search of the apartment at 87 Fayston Street, Unit #3, in nearby Dorchester, Massachusetts, which the targets had shifted to using as their base of operations, revealed an additional \$35,000.00 and 77.0 grams of cocaine.

219. Subsequent to PENA PENA's arrest on May 7, 2015, HSI SAC Boston was contacted by the Boston Police Department regarding an individual they had in custody under the name "Julio Negron." This individual's FBI number showed him to be the same person using the name Giscard Yohsiati PENA PENA. In addition to the charges in the instant case, PENA PENA had several criminal convictions including a record of narcotics distribution and was previously deported from the United States to the Dominican Republic on February 7, 2013.

220. On May 18, 2015, agents from HSI SAC Boston approached the owner of the unit PENA PENA had been observed exiting prior to conducting the money drop on April 13, 2015. After learning that the apartment had been "abandoned" by the previous tenant and that it was currently vacant, consent to search was secured from the owner. A search revealed numerous items associated with narcotics trafficking and money laundering. In a hallway closet, agents observed a heavy steel press used for packaging controlled substances. Near the steel press agents located numerous plastic baggies and a clutch of license plates from both Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

221. The back bedroom of the apartment agents located powdered lactic acid, a common cutting agent used by narcotics traffickers. Nearby, agents discovered a ledger containing several pages of notes listing names, dates, measurements/amounts, and dollar figures. In close proximity to the ledger was a plastic baggie containing a densely packed light brown powdery substance, consistent with heroin. A subsequent field test showed that the baggie contained 13.43 grams of heroin, with a street value in Boston of over \$1,000.00.

222. In a second bedroom agents observed the name "Gismardi Pena" written on the armrest of a couch in black marker. Additionally, agents observed the work "Yensy," written nearby. In that same room agents discovered a plastic baggie containing a white powdery

substance that also appeared to be narcotics. A field test of the substance showed that the baggie contained 99.6 grams of cocaine, with a value of between \$5,000.00 and \$10,000.00 on the streets of Boston depending on packaging and quality. Thereafter, a food-grade heat sealer, and electronic scale, and several rolls of plastic bags were discovered. Heat sealers, such as the one in question are common a common tool employed by narcotics traffickers to package drugs and bulk currency. In addition to their ability to compress the items being sealed, they are desirable for their perceived ability to lock-in the scent of narcotics or currency, thus thwarting law enforcement's ability to use trained K-9 units to detect their presence in hidden from view. In the same room, agents located an insurance bill addressed to an individual named "Julio SANTIAGO NEGRON."

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT ECHO
AMBIORIS ACOSTA DE LA CRUZ
JUNE 2, 2015 – NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
\$79,880.00

223. On June 2, 2015, HSI SAC Newark conducted a seizure of \$79,880.00, in Elizabeth, New Jersey. This seizure was the result of surveillance conducted on Ambioris Antonio ACOSTA de la CRUZ, the money courier identified as conducting the January 6, February 5, and February 27, transactions previously articulated. During the spring of 2015, ACOSTA de la CRUZ was tracked traveling to a suspected stash house in Hazelton, Pennsylvania. Subsequently, on June 2, 2015, the resident of that house, Alexis GRUYAIR SANCHEZ¹⁵, was surveilled traveling into New Jersey where he met with two other individuals

¹⁵ Subsequent to this seizure, in March of 2016, federal agents raided a narcotics stash house in New Jersey associated with GRUYAIR SANCHEZ. Inside of that location GRUYAIR SANCHEZ's passport was located along with kilogram quantities of both cocaine and heroin. GRUYAIR SANCHEZ is a convicted felon, on probation, and currently a fugitive from justice.

in the Garden's Mall parking lot in Elizabeth and received a white bag, containing the currency in question.

224. After the exchange, traffic stops were conducted on each vehicle engaged in the transaction. The vehicle which housed the white bag was found to contain \$79,880.00 packaged in quick-count bundles. In addition to the U.S. currency, a digital scale consistent with those used to weigh narcotics for packaging and sale, was located inside the vehicle. The driver could not explain the nature of his travels or the presence of the currency, which was thereafter seized.

225. Inside the vehicle that had dropped off the U.S. currency officers located a laptop bag which, instead of containing a laptop, contained a stack of SIM cards with a note that stated "change every 11 days." "SIM" stands for "subscriber identity module" or "subscriber identification module," and is an integrated circuit chip that is intended to securely store the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) numbers and their related keys, which are used to identify and authenticate subscribers on mobile phones. It is also possible to store contacts on many SIM cards. Because each SIM card is associated with an individual telephone number, for a number of years criminals have made use of the portability of SIM cards to disguise their illegal activity by making use of multiple SIM cards and a single phone. The idea being that, if law enforcement is eavesdropping on your communications or tracking your movements via your phone's GPS system or cell tower communications, by switching SIM cards within your electronic device, you effectively go dark until you make use of that particular card again. The note, "change every 11 days," along with the cache of SIM cards would appear to be instructions from a supervisor that the user of the SIM cards is to constantly rotate the card in his/her cell phone or cell phones.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 17
SUBJECT UNIDENTIFIED
JULY 22, 2015 – CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$49,980.00

226. On July 21, 2015, HSI SAC Miami Special Agents received information from CS1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash pickup of \$50,000.00 in Chicago, Illinois. Later on that day, HSI Miami contacted HSI SAC Chicago Special Agents to assist in this operation. A phone number and passphrase, “Rue da con Chema de parte de Hector,” was provided by LIZARAZO MENDOZA.

227. Later that day an HSI UC attempted contact with the money courier with negative results. Shortly thereafter, it was learned that the passphrase had been changed to “Jaime de parte de Brian,” and that the courier would be initiating the contact with the HSI UC. That evening, the UC received a call from an unknown individual stating that he was looking for “Jaime,” and that he was calling on behalf of “Brian.” The UC then asked how many “tickets” the caller had and was told that there were “fifty.” They agreed to speak the following day to agree upon a meeting location.

228. On July 22, 2015, the courier and UC spoke again. The courier stated that he would be ready to meet soon, but that at the moment he was still “reviewing” the “documents.” After agreeing to meet at the Aurora Outlet Mall, outside of Chicago, the courier said he would be sending a third party to the meet and that he would not be present.

229. After changing meet locations, at approximately 3:15 p.m., a silver Chrysler minivan occupied by two individuals approached the UC’s vehicle, which was parked in a Walmart parking lot. The passenger of the vehicle then entered the UC vehicle with a pink bag containing \$49,980.00 in quick count bundles, some of which were shrink wrapped. The UC recognized this individual’s voice as being the same as the individual he had been speaking with

on the phone. Upon inspection, a narcotics detecting K-9 unit made a positive alert to the presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

230. Later that evening, the UC received a phone call from an unidentified individual using a different phone number. The caller asked the UC if he had met with “my guy.” He then clarified that he was referring to a meeting between “Jaime” and “Brian,” for “fifty tickets.” After being advised that the transaction had been completed, the caller then stated that he had not been notified of the exchange by the UC’s people. The caller asked the UC to reach out to the UC’s people and request that they contact him to verify the transaction. The UC agreed to do so, but, ultimately, was unable to reestablish contact with the unidentified caller.

231. As always, CS1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to wire transfer the funds, minus the CS’s commission. For this transaction, LIZARAZO MENDOZA requested the funds be deposited into the following bank account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited
Hong Kong
Account:
SWIFT: HSBCHKHHHKH

232. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

RACKETEERING PREDICATE ACT NUMBER 18
PEDRO HERNANDEZ
AUGUST 17, 2015 – CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$102,270.00

233. On August 16, 2015, HSI SAC Miami special agents received information from CS1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA contacted CS1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash pickup of \$130,000 in Chicago, Illinois. The passphrase for the transaction was to be “Pancho de parte de

Miguel.” Later on that same day, HSI Miami contacted HSI SAC Chicago Special Agents to assist in this operation.

234. On August 17, 2015, an undercover agent contacted the money courier and the two agreed to meet later that day at a Lowe’s home improvement store in Chicago. The UC had requested that the unidentified male meet him inside of the Lowe’s, but the subject refused due to the presence of security cameras. The subject then stated that he would leave the currency inside a silver Nissan Murano parked next to some drywall stacked near the exit of the building. The UC was instructed that the subject would be standing next to the vehicle to keep an lookout and for the UC to enter the vehicle and remove a bag containing the currency.

235. Upon locating the vehicle, the UC entered and removed a white shopping bag, which contained a woman’s shoe box packed with \$102,270.00 in U.S. currency, separated into quick-count bundles. A latent fingerprint belonging to an individual named Pedro HERNANDEZ (DOB: 07/14/1981) was subsequently developed from the shoe box containing the currency. Shortly thereafter, an individual later identified as HERNANDEZ, entered the Nissan Murano which the currency had been left in and drove away. Surveillance units attempted to follow HERNANDEZ, however, he employed counter-surveillance measures, forcing the agents to break off their pursuit. Ultimately a photograph of HERNANDEZ was compared to surveillance stills taken on the date of the exchange and he was positively identified as the subject of the transaction. HERNANDEZ, is a convicted felon, who has served time in prison in Illinois, with a history of arrests for violent crime, illegally in the United States from the Mexican state of Guerrero.

236. After the currency was exchanged, it was transported to the Chicago SAC Office, where a trained narcotics detection K-9 unit alerted to the presence of narcotics on the currency.

237. After the transaction was confirmed, CS1 was instructed by LIZARAZO MENDOZA to wire transfer the funds, minus the CS's commission, to the following bank account:

Grand Metropolitan Limited
Hong Kong
Account:
SWIFT: HSBCHKHCHKH

238. The bank account in question is an off-shore funnel account controlled by a business in Miami-Dade County, which then transferred to an account in Miami-Dade County as payment for products that were exported to various business associates in Colombia.

239. On August 18, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA was arrested in Cali, Colombia, pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice, issued at the behest of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California, based on their investigation into money laundering in California on behalf of the Sinaloa Cartel. After being arrested he was transferred from Cali, to La Picota Prison in Bogota, to await an extradition hearing.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT FOXTROT
VICTOR ALBERTO NOGUEDA SOBERANIS
AUGUST 28, 2015 – CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
\$185,810.00

240. On August 26, 2015, HSI SAC Miami Special Agents received information from CS1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA had contacted CS1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash pickup of \$130,000.00. On August 26, 2015 HSI SAC Miami Special Agents contacted HSI SAC Chicago to assist in identifying the courier and seizing the U.S. Currency. Upon receiving the money courier's phone number and the passphrase, "Tomas de parte de Miguel," a HSI UC called the courier and arranged to meet him in the parking lot of a Home Depot.

241. On August 28, 2015, the courier, subsequently identified as Victor Alberto NOGUEDA SOBERANIS (DOB: 5/17/92), attempted to meet the UC, but after surveillance units established NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's presence in the Home Depot parking lot, the UC placed a call to him to cancel the pick-up for the day in favor of a later date. The UC stated that the parking lot was "hot," which was a signal to NOGUEDA SOBERANIS that the transaction should not take place because of a police presence in the area. On the target's travels from the meet location back to his residence, HSI SAC Chicago Special Agents had officers of the Chicago Police Department conduct a stop of his vehicle for a traffic infraction. Subsequently NOGUEDA SOBERANIS granted the officers consent to search his vehicle. The consent search resulted in the discovery of bulk U.S. Currency in quick-count bundles. The total U.S. Currency seized from the vehicle was \$134,980.00.

242. Following the traffic stop, HSI received permission to search the subject's residence, which he shared with his parents at 2200 N. Kostner Avenue, Apartment #2, in the City of Chicago. Prior to conducting the search, agents spoke with NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's mother, Marinela SOBERANIS LORENZANA who stated that she did not know if there was any contraband in her home, but that she had recently become aware that her son was involved in the sale of narcotics. She went on to state that members of their family had been murdered in the Mexican State of Guerrero due to their involvement in narcotics trafficking and that she feared for her son.

243. A search of the residence revealed an additional \$50,830.00 in quick-count bundles, in a suitcase which also contained approximately 1 ¼ kilograms of cocaine in NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's bedroom. In addition to the cocaine and currency, there were three cell phones, a ledger, and packaging materials found in NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's bedroom.

In the kitchen, on top of the refrigerator, agents located a small digital scale. All of the aforementioned items were seized and impounded.

244. Subsequent to the search, NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's step-father, Mauricio Omar HERNANDEZ accompanied agents to the Chicago Police Department to be interviewed. HERNANDEZ stated that NOGUEDA SOBERANIS had recently become involved in the distribution of narcotics and was selling cocaine from their house, as well as other locations. A consent search of HERNANDEZ's cell phone revealed communications consistent with narcotics distribution. When confronted with this evidence, HERNANDEZ admitted to engaging in narcotics trafficking in conjunction with NOGUEDA SOBERANIS and that he had sold ounces of cocaine for roughly \$1,100.00 per ounce. When asked about some of the contacts saved in his phone HERNANDEZ admitted that one of the contacts, "El Borreguion," was a customer for his and NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's cocaine distribution operation. HERNANDEZ stated that a few weeks prior he had sold El Borreguion three to four ounces of cocaine which NOGUEDA SOBERANIS had provided him and that NOGUEDA SOBERANIS was given \$2,000.00 after the transaction was completed.

245. At this point, HERNANDEZ became apprehensive that his incriminating statements may subject him to arrest and refused to answer any further questions. He was subsequently told that he was free to leave.

246. Following NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's arrest, he, too, was transported to the Chicago Police Department to be interviewed. Prior to interviewing the subject agents administered the Miranda warnings and NOGUEDA SOBERANIS signed a written rights waiver form stating his understanding of his rights and willingness to speak with law enforcement. During the course of the interview NOGUEDA SOBERANIS stated that the

vehicle he had been driving was not his and that he had borrowed it from a friend that he only knew as "Luis." He indicated that he had only picked up the vehicle that morning and driven it to a Dunkin Donuts prior to being stopped by the Chicago Police Department. NOGUEDA SOBERANIS asserted that he did not know there was any currency housed in the vehicle and stated that he assumed the money belonged to the aforementioned "Luis." A records check of the vehicle in question, a black 2011 Jeep Liberty bearing Illinois plate Y818947 revealed that the vehicle was owned by NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's mother Marinela SOBERANIS LORNZANA and registered to their home address, 2200 North Kostner Avenue, Apartment 2, Chicago, Illinois, 60639. NOGUEDA SOBERANIS denied any involvement with narcotics distribution and when confronted with the additional evidence located in his bedroom, he stated his desire to speak to an attorney, at which point the interview was terminated.

247. On August 31, 2015, the currency seized from NOGUEDA SOBERANIS's vehicle was inspected by a trained narcotics detecting K-9 unit. The dog gave a positive alert for the presence of a controlled substance on the currency.

The Debriefing of Ivan Alfredo Castro Santana, Bogota, Colombia, December 17, 2015

248. From December 14, 2015, through December 18, 2015, a contingent of state and federal personnel from Miami, including both A1 and A2, traveled to Bogota, Colombia, along with representatives of the federal government from California, to conduct interviews with target subjects, including Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, in La Picota Prison. During CASTRO SANTANA's interview, he had local counsel, Mario Simvaqueua, as well as an attorney from Miami, Florida, Paola Ramirez, representing his interests. The interview was conducted in

conjunction with a Special Agent Manny Martinez from HSI's attaché office located in the United States Embassy in Bogota.

249. During the interview CASTRO SANTANA discussed laundering money via the Black Market Peso Exchange as well as via hawala, which, he referred to as "contra entrega" ("mirror transaction" in Spanish). He stated that the money that he and his associates laundered was on behalf of Mexican narco-traffickers. His hawaladar in Mexico is an individual operating in Mexico City named Jorge CASTANO, whom was identified on our wiretaps as "PELON." Although CASTRO SANTANA knew certain aspects of the identities of some of the individuals he was partnered with in Mexico, he denied knowing the specific cartel or cartels that they represented. Intelligence gathered on these individuals, some of whom are under indictment by the United States Federal Government in California, shows that they are agents of the Sinaloa Cartel.

250. CASTRO SANTANA acknowledged that amongst other BBM monikers, he had made use of "PEDRITO," "MIGUEL," and "ANTONIO," while working in conjunction with an individual known as Ivan LNU aka "ARMANI." Ivan CASTRO SANTANA spoke in some detail regarding his partnership with Ivan LNU, which he stated eventually came to an end at some point in 2015 due to their inability to agree on how to resolve a dispute that arose from the seizure of \$200,000 in Miami. He stated that prior to the breakdown in their business relationship, he and Ivan LNU had partnered in a money laundering enterprise, along with a varying group of other individuals, during the years 2014 and 2015. He noted that he was the main point of contact with the narco-traffickers and that Ivan LNU acted as their point of contact with the individuals who would pick-up the currency in the United States, as well as with the Latin American businesses that were being used to launder the money.

251. When asked about the individual known as "MAKARIO," a/k/a "The Man in Red," CASTRO SANTANA stated that MAKARIO worked for him as his personal representative to "La Oficina." CASTRO SANTANA described La Oficina as a professional organization of kidnappers, specializing in violent means of extorting individuals who owed drug debts to the cartels that employed their services. MAKARIO was an emissary who would deal directly with La Oficina and generally keep abreast of the status of collections being undertaken. CASTRO SANTANA noted that MAKARIO had acted on his behalf in this capacity during the course of the collection instituted over the \$200,000 seized in Miami.

NARCO-MONEY LAUNDERING INCIDENT GOLF
JOHN BYRON WATSON
FEBRUARY 25, 2016 – PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
\$73,000

252. In February 2016, HSI SAC Miami Special Agents received information from CS1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA had contacted CS1 regarding assisting with a bulk cash pickup of \$120,000.00 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, HSI SAC Philadelphia was contacted to attempt to identify the money courier and seize the money, if possible. Upon receiving the money courier's phone number and the passphrase, a HSI UC called the courier and arranged for a meeting.

253. On February 25, 2016, HSI SAC Philadelphia agents were able to track the money courier, subsequently identified as John Byron WATSON, to a home within the Philadelphia city limits where the bulk currency was being stashed. The courier was seen leaving this location with a heavily laden plastic shopping bag. Thereupon he entered a white late model sedan with tinted front and back windows. A roving surveillance was set upon the vehicle and, ultimately, a traffic stop was conducted. A subsequent search of WATSON's

vehicle revealed \$73,000 in U.S. currency in quick-count bundles, packaged inside of plastic shopping bags. A subsequent ion scan of the currency showed the presence of cocaine on the bills. Because the currency in question was seized prior to the contemplated exchange, no deposit or wiring instructions were ever transmitted from LIZARAZO MENDOZA to CS1.

The Approach of Ivan Andres Lizarazo Mendoza, Republic of Panama, February 28, 2016

254. From February 26, 2016, through February 29, 2016, a contingent of members of the Operation Neymar team from Miami, including A2, traveled to Panama City, in the Republic of Panama, for the purpose of making an approach on Ivan Andres LIZARAZO MENDOZA. LIZARAZO MENDOZA had been identified entering Panama at Tocumen International Airport in Panama City, from Cali, Colombia, on February 24, 2016, with his girlfriend, Ana Milena PENA LORZA (DOB: 11/21/1984). On February 27, 2016, in coordination with HSI's Panama Attaché Office and members of the Panamanian National Police, a trip was taken across the isthmus, from Panama City to the Port of Colon, on the Caribbean Sea, where LIZARAZO MENDOZA was staying at the Sheraton Hotel, conducting business in the Free Zone. However, by the time of HSI's arrival at the Sheraton in Colon, LIZARAZO MENDOZA had already checked out of the hotel and departed from the Caribbean/Atlantic side of the country. From Colon, he had headed back to Panama City, staying at the Double Tree Hotel, before heading to a beachside town along the coast for one final night. Because it was known that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was scheduled to leave Panama the following night, it was determined to hold off on approaching him until he checked in at Tocumen International Airport, for his flight back to Cali.

255. On February 28, 2016, at approximately 7:00 p.m., LIZARAZO MENDOZA and PENA LORZA were observed checking their bags at the Copa Airlines ticket counter at Tocumen. Thereafter, they proceeded toward the security checkpoint where, in coordination with several plainclothes members of the vetted unit of the Panamanian National Police, Special Agent Robert Jimenez of HSI's Panama Attaché Office approached LIZARAZO MENDOZA. After SA Jimenez identified himself and his companions as law enforcement personnel, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and PENA LORZA stepped away from the security check point and LIZARAZO MENDOZA agreed to speak in private.

256. At a discrete location within the Copa Airlines terminal at Tocumen, SA Jimenez and A2 sat down with LIZARAZO MENDOZA to discuss the facts of Operation Neymar. At the inception of the interview, SA Jimenez and A2 revealed strategic pieces of information implicating LIZARAZO MENDOZA in international money laundering. Immediately LIZARAZO MENDOZA's demeanor changed from guarded, yet confident, to extreme nervousness. In response to the suggestion that he was involved in illegal activity, LIZARAZO MENDOZA acted paradoxically, first steadfastly denying any wrongdoing and subsequently making cagey inquiries into whether there were specific names that law enforcement would like him to provide information against, while at the same time expressing a hesitance to speak freely due to concerns that the conversation was being recorded.

257. Regardless of his denials, over the course of the interview that followed LIZARAZO MENDOZA made a series of incriminating statements in response to questions by A2. When shown pictures of known associates from Colombia and the United States he uniformly feigned ignorance of their identities. In fact, he was so thoroughly hesitant to acknowledge any connection to any of his known associates that he only identified his own

sister's photograph after a significant pregnant pause. When shown a photograph of his brother-in-law, Alejandro LEON VEGA, LIZARAZO MENDOZA stated that he did not know who the man in the photo was. After denying knowing LEON VEGA, A2 informed LIZARAZO MENDOZA that the man in the photo was LIZARAZO MENDOZA's brother-in-law, to which LIZARAZO MENDOZA stated that he was now able to recognize LEON VEGA, and that his difficulty recognizing him was attributed to the photograph not being a very representative image of him. When shown a photograph of his long-time business partner, Ivan Alfredo CASTRO SANTANA, he again held tightly to the proposition that he had no idea whom was depicted in the photo.

258. The conversation then turned to the fact that LIZARAZO MENDOZA did not attend his sister's wedding in Miami during February of 2015. He acknowledged that he was not present at the ceremony, but stated that his absence was not because of fear of U.S. law enforcement in the aftermath of the \$200,000 seizure that took place in Miami two weeks before the ceremony. Instead, he maladroitly explained that he became suddenly ill and did not make the trip to the United States due to being sick.

259. At one point, in an attempt at incredulity, LIZARAZO MENDOZA nervously fired a series of questions at SA Jimenez and A2 demanding to see the physical evidence tying him to the transactions in question. Specifically, he attempted to challenge the interviewers to produce video tapes or audio tapes. This was instructive for two reasons:

First, although not unheard of, innocent people do not tend to demand to see proof-positive of their guilt in the form of physical evidence immediately upon being questioned by the police. Training and experience in this area shows that, typically, a person wrongly accused of criminal activity of this magnitude remains in a state of semi-shock, astonishment, confusion, or

disbelief until given time away from their accuser to collect their thoughts and analyze the situation. Common sense dictates that another reason that innocent people do not ask for such proof is their affirmative knowledge that such evidence does not and could not exist. In this case, the only emotion LIZARAZO MENDOZA betrayed was his nearly palpable nervousness. Other than being nervous, he appeared calm, poised, and generally composed throughout the interview.

Second, his specific demand for the production of audio or video recordings was narrowly tailored to meet his method of operation and manner of maintaining anonymity – the exclusive use of electronic communications, which cannot be verified by audio or video recordings of the transmissions.

260. Towards the end of the interview, LIZARAZO MENDOZA was told that this would be his only opportunity to improve upon his situation via speaking with law enforcement. In a moment of what appeared to be resignation, he argued that he was not a “big kingpin.” While this could have been interpreted as a continued denial of the criminal accusations being leveled against him, in context, it appeared to be LIZARAZO MENDOZA acknowledging his culpability and engaging in minimization of his role in the enterprise.

261. Shortly thereafter, the interview was terminated and LIZARAZO MENDOZA repeatedly asked A2 for a copy of his business card so that he could contact him when he got back to Colombia. A2 instructed LIZARAZO MENDOZA that if he contacted him for the purpose of meeting again, either with or without an attorney present, the meeting could not take place in Cali, because of the risk of co-conspirators seeing LIZARAZO MENDOZA interacting with law enforcement and that such a meeting would have to take place in a neutral location, such as Panama. Inexplicably, in spite of LIZARAZO MENDOZA’s persistent denials of

wrongdoing, he agreed with A2's assessment regarding the location of any future face-to-face meetings and the need for discretion.

262. The following day, March 1, 2016, despite LIZARAZO MENDOZA's denial of being the user of BBM1, immediately upon his return to Cali, the active PIN associated with BBM1 was discontinued and a new PIN was passed along to CS1. Interestingly, the previous day, while being interviewed in Panama, LIZARAZO MENDOZA had been confronted with the exclusive use of international soccer players as BBM monikers for BBM1. The following day when he switched PINs, for the first time in the two year history of this investigation, the new PIN associated with BBM1 was not in the name of a soccer player. The fact that this PIN was immediately dumped after a significant law enforcement action follows LIZARAZO MENDOZA's established, reflexive dropping of BBM PINs in the face of law enforcement activity that he believes could expose him to criminal liability, as evinced by his actions in both December of 2014 and January of 2015.

CS1's Identification of Lizarazo Mendoza

263. From December 2015 through March of 2016 CS1 was questioned on multiple occasions regarding the various attempts that had been made to conceal or disguise the identity of the source of the money laundering contracts in question. At the inception of Operation Neymar, CS1 had stated that he did not know the true identity of his source of money laundering contracts and as the case developed, he maintained that he could not positively identify this individual. As discussed in this affidavit's section on the methodology employed by BMPE money brokers and narcotics traffickers, although bosses and supervisors must always know the identity of their workers, the subordinate workers are often unaware of the identity of the

individual they are working for and are intentionally kept in the dark. For more than a year CS1 had assumed that Carlos Alberto MOSQUERA VALDES, a Diamante Building money broker who works in conjunction with the Enterprise, was providing the contracts. More recently, it became clear to CS1 that MOSQUERA VALDES and the individual providing the contracts for Operation Neymar were two different people. In response to this development, efforts at discerning the true identity of the money broker behind the Operation Neymar contracts was renewed.

264. During a debriefing of CS1 in December of 2015, A2 showed CS1 a photograph Ivan Andres LIZARAZO MENDOZA and asked CS1 if he knew the man in the picture. CS1 stated that he knew LIZARAZO MENDOZA and was aware that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was a BMPE money broker operating in Cali, Colombia. CS1 further stated that he was aware that LIZARAZO MENDOZA had a sister that lived in the United States and that in February of 2015 LIZARAZO MENDOZA had planned to travel to his sister's wedding in Miami, Florida. CS1 went on to state that he knew that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was unable to make the planned trip because he had a large amount of U.S. currency seized in Miami in the time immediately preceding his sister's wedding and that LIZARAZO MENDOZA had expressed a concern that if he traveled to Florida he could get "caught up" in the investigation.

265. Among other factors used to establish LIZARAZO MENDOZA as the source of the money laundering contracts in Operation Neymar, as previously detailed in this affidavit, on January 30, 2015, HSI seized approximately \$200,000 from LIZARAZO MENDOZA's sister, Sidia Milady, in Miami. Subsequently, via wire interceptions, it was learned that the source of the contract that resulted in the seizure spent his own money hiring an attorney in the United States for Sidia Milady – an act consistent with a close familial relationship. Two weeks after

the date of the seizure, February 14, 2015, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA married her fiancé, Alejandro LEON VEGA, in Miami, which corresponds to the date that Ivan Andres LIZARAZO MENDOZA was scheduled to be in Miami for *his* sister's wedding.

A Meeting between CS1 and Lizarazo Mendoza, Cali, Colombia, March 2016

266. In the month of March 2016, at the direction of A2, CS1 met LIZARAZO MENDOZA for lunch in the San Sur neighborhood of Cali. The San Sur neighborhood is home to a secondary currency exchange center and LIZARAZO MENDOZA maintains one of his two storefronts there. During the meeting, LIZARAZO MENDOZA told CS1 that LIZARAZO MENDOZA needed to talk to CS1 in private and that CS1 must keep the conversation in complete confidence. After CS1 agreed to keep the information to himself, LIZARAZO MENDOZA explained that while in Panama LIZARAZO MENDOZA had been approached by U.S. law enforcement and confronted with evidence related to money laundering. Based on LIZARAZO MENDOZA's behavior, demeanor, and mannerisms, CS1 had the distinct feeling that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was either recoding their conversation for later use or LIZARAZO MENDOZA was afraid that the conversation was being recorded. It is known that LIZARAZO MENDOZA is recording/surveillance conscious because during his interview at Tocumen International Airport in Panama, he had stated that he was concerned that the interview was being secretly recorded to be used against him. Regardless, LIZARAZO MENDOZA indicated that he was extremely fearful that he would be arrested and extradited to the United States and, although he never explicitly acknowledged being a money launderer, he openly complained to CS1 that the "heat" from the wiretaps he had been confronted with had originated in Bogota.

267. LIZARAZO MENDOZA went on to state that he was not a major figure and that the important people were the owners of the money in Mexico. He subsequently began to discuss the \$200,000 seizure which took place in Miami in January of 2015, stating that the money in question had been seized directly from someone he described as “a friend of the family.” CS1 then innocently asked LIZARAZO MENDOZA if LIZARAZO MENDOZA was the broker responsible for the contract that resulted in that seizure, to which he stated, “No,” while simultaneously giving a coy wink and nod to CS1. CS1 understood LIZARAZO MENDOZA’s response to be an acknowledgment that LIZARAZO MENDOZA was in fact the broker, but that he did not want to audibly acknowledge it.

268. LIZARAZO MENDOZA then sought CS1’s counsel on whether or not LIZARAZO MENDOZA should contact the federal agent he had met in Panama to “talk.” In this context CS1 understood the verb “talk,” to mean cooperate with law enforcement or negotiate out a deal. In discussing his options, LIZARAZO MENDOZA expressed grave concern over the wiretap line sheets that he had been confronted with at the airport in Panama, but stated that he never talks over the phone, so the government should not be able to prove that the communications in question belonged to him. The two then discussed how to communicate in secrecy via BBMs and VOIPs, and the need to frequently change PINs and phone numbers.

Forty-four Factors Indicative of “Operation Neymar” as Trade-Based Barro-Money Laundering

269. Among the facts delineated above, your co-Affiants posit that the following are indicative of each of the subjects in question being engaged in trade based money laundering:

First, the money couriers and UCs picking up the currency have no preexisting business or personal relationship and, in fact, do not know each other;

Second, neither the money couriers nor the UCs ever claim to be representing any legitimate business interests;

Third, code phrases or serial numbers were always used to identify the parties involved, while true identities were never contemplated, offered, requested, or exchanged;

Fourth, code names are used for the cities where the individual transactions are to take place, in order to obscure the location from law enforcement – such intentional obfuscation would be a significant detriment to legitimate business while serving no warrantable purpose;

Fifth, traditionally employed business vernacular describing currency was generally not used in communications between each side's couriers – instead each party would vaguely refer to the currency in codes. In various Operation Neymar pick-ups, the currency was referred to as “the problem,” “cans of paint,” “tickets,” “documents,” “gallons,” “that item,” and “the package”;

Sixth, hotel rooms, motel rooms, houses, or apartments, as opposed to businesses, banks, accounting firms, or other financial institutions always served as the point of departure for the couriers and currency;

Seventh, cash drops always took place in public locations, such as parking lots, never inside of businesses or financial institutions where legitimate large-scale monetary transactions would typically take place. In one especially paradoxical transaction, the exchange of currency actually took place in the parking lot of a bank;

Eighth, the locations of the exchange were often changed several times for no apparent reason or due to one side or the other expressing a fear of law enforcement activity in the area;

Ninth, the couriers being employed by the owners of the currency were frequently convicted felons or illegal aliens – two classes of people least likely to be entrusted with hundreds of thousands of dollars of proceeds belonging to a legitimate business;

Tenth, the money being exchanged was never counted by either party at the time of the transaction and no alternative attempts were made to ensure the accuracy of the amount being handed off;

Eleventh, receipts or other forms of verification were never requested from the UCs by the money couriers as proof of the successful exchange and completion of the transaction;

Twelfth, the amount of cash being exchanged is hideously large – with contracts ranging between \$50,000 and \$1,000,000, typically involving at least six figures of currency. Legitimate businesses capable of generating such large amounts of revenue almost never accept cash for their products. Business being conducted on this scale is almost universally conducted via wire-transfers between vetted accounts belonging to known entities at major financial institutions;

Thirteenth, the amount of currency contracted for and the actual amount of currency that was ultimately exchanged did not match up on twenty-two of the twenty-three attempted or completed exchanges endeavored during this operation. There were accounting variances of as much as approximately \$90,000 in a single transaction, at times consisting of couriers providing too much currency and at times providing too little currency. Such discrepancies would not be tolerated in transactions between legitimate businesses;

Fourteenth, the currency was always concealed in a fashion irreconcilable with legitimate business – generally transported in shopping bags, shoe boxes, electronics packaging, sometimes shrink-wrapped, and, one at least one occasion, secreted in a hidden compartment built into the vehicle being used by the money courier;

Fifteenth, the currency was never packaged in the manner one would expect in a legitimate business transaction involving such large amounts of currency, namely crisp, sequential, bank-banded \$100 bills. Instead, the currency in question was always packaged in quick-count bundles of well-worn, non-sequential bills of multiple varying denominations;

Sixteenth, the money couriers regularly employed counter-surveillance measures in order to avoid detection by law enforcement. Such measures included refusing to visit locations that would likely have security cameras on the premises, engaging in “dead drops” where the courier leaves the currency in a specified location and simply observes the retrieval by his counterpart, conducting “heat runs,” employing various “cleaning” techniques, etc;

Seventeenth, several of the money couriers and associated individuals approached in connection with this case stated their knowledge or belief that the currency in question was the proceeds of narcotics sales;

Eighteenth, narcotics and/or narcotics paraphernalia have been discovered in multiple locations identified as stash-houses for the bulk currency in question. In one notable example, a kilogram of cocaine was discovered sitting on top of \$50,000 in U.S. currency in a stash house in Chicago, Illinois;

Nineteenth, on every occasion in which a narcotics detection K-9 was used to inspect bulk currency associated with this operation, the respective K-9 units alerted to the presence of narcotics on the currency – similarly on at least one occasion an ion scanner was used to search currency and in that instance the device in question gave a positive alert for the presence of cocaine on the bills;

Twentieth, the money brokers and couriers habitually switched phones and changed numbers, which is antithetical to legitimate business practices – for example, LIZARAZO MENDOZA changed his BBM PIN at least five times between May of 2014 and May of 2015;

Twenty-first, CS1 informed HSI that LIZARAZO MENDOZA instructed him to exclusively use drop phones to coordinate the bulk-cash pick-ups and to change the phone being used every few weeks;

Twenty-second, the money brokers and currency owners exclusively use fictitious names when communicating via BBM;

Twenty-third, the money brokers continually change the fake names being used every time they change BBM PINs, showing an effort to continuously mask their true identities;

Twenty-fourth, on multiple occasions the targeted money brokers have specifically discussed changing their BBM PINs due to concerns about law enforcement activity;

Twenty-fifth, the targets universally speak in code to refer to the money being moved and the locations of the money, a practice that would only confuse and inhibit the efficient operation of legitimate business;

Twenty-sixth, the manner in which these transactions took place, involving third-party wire transfers of exorbitant sums of money from individuals both unknown and completely unconnected to any of the recipient's business contacts, is not employed in sector of legitimate businesses for numerous obvious reasons;

Twenty-seventh, one of LIZARAZO MENDOZA's associates, CRISTO, advised LIZARAZO MENDOZA to no longer work with a certain business because CRISTO believed the owner of the business was a government informant – a concern clearly outside the realm of factors taken into consideration by legitimate businesses;

Twenty-eighth, LIZARAZO MENDOZA told one of his associates, ANA MARIA, to instruct one of his money couriers, Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA, to hide information from the attorney he hired for Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA in order to protect the illegal nature of their business. He also instructed ANA MARIA to find out everything that Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA had told the Department of Homeland Security;

Twenty-ninth, after the conversation described directly above, LIZARAZO MENDOZA told ANA MARIA that someone had “ratted on us”; a well-known term used exclusively to express the concept that a third party notified an authority figure that someone was doing something illegal, amoral, untoward, or otherwise contrary to policy or normative behavior;

Thirtieth, the owner of the \$200,000 seized in Miami on January 30, 2015, referred to CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA as “rats,” in connection with the seizure. Instead of bringing the issue to the courts for litigation, the owner simply states that if they do not pay, they will be kidnapped – a modus operandi not employed by legitimate business;

Thirty-first, a series of communications on a phone in the possession of Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA relating to the \$200,000 seized in Miami on January 30, 2015, showed an intent to lie to law enforcement regarding names, telephone numbers, and BBM PINs – such actions are not only illegal, but obviously incongruent with legitimate business practices;

Thirty-second, the parties to the conversations on the phone found in Sidia Milady LIZARAZO MENDOZA’s possession each expressed fear of going to jail, which is a stress that legitimate businesspersons need not brook;

Thirty-third, CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA discussed the fact that law enforcement had possession of the \$200,000 which they lost in Miami on January 30, 2015, but instead of hiring an attorney to file a claim on behalf of a legitimate interest in the currency,

they discussed the fact that the currency was the proceeds of narcotics sales and who should be responsible for repayment of the debt;

Thirty-fourth, CASTRO SANTANA subsequently spoke with the emissary to the owner of the \$200,000 seized in Miami, ALFARITO, on March 16, 2015, and the two discussed who was at fault for the seizure, the fact that the seizure was conducted by law enforcement, and the notice they had received of the seizure via publication in the newspaper. Subsequently on March 19, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and ALFARITO also discussed the formal publication of this seizure and the time frame in which a claim could be filed. Nevertheless, at no point did they discuss making a legal claim for the currency and at no point was a claim ever made;

Thirty-fifth, in two conversations between CASTRO SANTANA and SAN BLAS during March of 2015 the parties expressed concern that someone was “snitching” or “pointing a finger” at them, and that \$600,000 and 8 kilograms of an unspecified narcotic had been seized due to a phone being tracked by law enforcement – both concerns being antithetical to normative business practices;

Thirty-sixth, on March 17, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and ANTONY discussed their colleagues turning themselves in and “telling on everybody,” which clearly indicates a tacit acknowledgment of the illegal nature of their business, their fear of law enforcement, and their associates’ ability to expose their criminal activities;

Thirty-seventh, on March 17, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and SAN BLAS discuss a colleague being threatened with kidnapping for ransom and that individual’s great fear of the kidnappers in question, stating that “he wets his pants,” when they talk to him. They then then discuss the fact that the members of the kidnapping crew have accused them of being “rats”;

Thirty-eighth, on March 20, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and MARKARIO discuss not accepting BBM contact requests from unknown individuals because “there is always a rat around,” stating a concern that is obviously not shared by individuals operating legitimate business;

Thirty-ninth, on March 24, 2015, LIZARAZO MENDOZA and CASTRO SANTANA discussed their belief that the lawyer they hired to represent LIZARAZO-MENDOZA wanted to withdraw from her representation because he feared it could put his life in danger. It is axiomatic in the United States that members of the bar are not personally invested in the individuals they represent, the causes they advocate, or the controversies they litigate. There is no reason for an attorney practicing law in the United States to fear for his or her life based upon their professional endeavors unless they believe their clients are engaged in illegal behavior and willing to resort to extrajudicial processes to solve their disputes¹⁶;

Fortieth, on April 15, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA received an anonymous phone call from a representative of the owner of the \$200,000 seized in Miami, who demanded an in person meeting, but refused to identify himself. In response, CASTRO SANTANA contacted ALFARITO and stated that he was going to bring a “shooter,” with him to protect himself;

Forty-first, on April 17, 2015, there was an aborted attempt to kidnap LIZARAZO MENDOZA at a bar in Cali, Colombia, for his failure to pay out the \$200,000 which had been seized in Miami, Florida, in January – an extraordinary method of bill collecting, especially considering that the parties involved were well aware that the currency was in the hands of the United States Government and available to be returned to anyone with a legitimate claim. During the incident, LIZARAZO MENDOZA sent CASTRO SANTANA a communication

¹⁶ It should be noted that on March 16, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA and ALFARITO also discussed that the lawyer in this matter had been threatened by someone referred to as “El Negro.”

expressing his belief that the kidnappers were going to kill him. On April 18, 2015, CASTRO SANTANA spoke with MAKARIO regarding the \$200,000 debt owned by CASTRO SANTANA and LIZARAZO MENDOZA. During the conversation MAKARIO told CASTRO SANTANA that due to complications, La Oficina had been ready to kidnap LIZARAZO MENDOZA during the previous day's encounter;

Forty-second, in debriefing the owner of a business which was used by LIZARAZO MENDOZA and/or CASTRO SANTANA to launder money on at least a half dozen occasions, the owner stated the belief that the money in question was the proceeds of narcotics sales and went on to explained the manner in which the BMPE operates in extensive detail;

Forty-third, while being interviewed in December of 2015, CASTRO SANTANA acknowledged that both he and LIZARAZO MENDOZA were explicitly aware that the money being laundered was the proceeds of narcotics trafficking by drug cartels operating in Colombia and Mexico;

Forty-fourth, information provided by both federal and local law enforcement personnel with decades of experience in the field has corroborated the facts uncovered in this operation, including the existence of the BMPE, the universal knowledge of those involved that the currency in question is the product of narcotics trafficking, and that the exchanges in question are illegal.

Breakdown of Charges

270. Wherefore, A1 and A2 request that based on the probable cause articulated above, arrest warrants are issued for:

271. Ivan Andres **LIZARAZO MENDOZA**, for the following fifty-five (55) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Acts 1 through 18:

- Racketeering
a felony of the first degree;
- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Nine (9) Counts of Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree;
- Thirteen (13) Counts of Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Nine (9) Counts of Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree;
- Four (4) Counts of Conspiracy to Launder Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the third degree; and
- Eighteen (18) Counts of Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

272. Pedro **CARRASCO**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 1:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

273. Luis Avilar **HINESTROZA GONZALEZ**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 2:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

274. Diego **PERDOMO**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 3:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the third degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

275. Jesus **VALENCIA**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 5:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

276. Jose Angel **CORTEZ RAQUEZ**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 7:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

277. Alonso **RIVERA VALENZUELA**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 8:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

278. Javier **CASTRO LEYVA**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 9:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

279. Roberto **LOPEZ MORALES**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 9:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

280. Duvan **BOLANOS MORA**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 9:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

281. Fabio **MORENO**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 9:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

282. Edi **ACOSTA GAMEZ**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 10:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

283. Sidia Milady **LIZARAZO MENDOZA**, for the following six (6) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 11 and 14:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Two (2) Counts of Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Two (2) Counts of Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

284. Alejandro **LEON VEGA**, for the following six (6) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 11 and 14:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Two (2) Counts of Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Two (2) Counts of Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

285. Ambioris **ACOSTA de la CRUZ**, for the following six (6) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 12 and 15:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Two (2) Counts of Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Two (2) Counts of Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

286. Francisco **HARO RODRIGUEZ**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 13:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the third degree;
- Money Laundering Over \$20k, Less than \$100k
a felony of the second degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

287. Giscard Yohsiati **PENA PENA**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with RICO Predicate Act 16:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

288. Pedro **HERNANDEZ**, for the following four (4) felony offenses associated with

RICO Predicate Act 18:

- RICO Conspiracy
a felony of the first degree;
- Conspiracy to Launder \$100k or More
a felony of the second degree;
- Money Laundering \$100k or More
a felony of the first degree; and
- Unlawful Use of a Two-Way Communications Device
a felony of the third degree

AFFIANT #1, Jonathan Santana
Detective – Narcotics Bureau
Miami Dade Police Department

AFFIANT #2, Charles Thomas
Special Agent – Financial Crimes
Homeland Security Investigations

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS THE ____ DAY OF
_____, 2016.

JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA